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A NUCLEAR KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT: PROPOSING
A TREATY FOR THE RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR
WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY
David A. Koplowt
Si vis pacem, para bellum ("If you want peace, prepare for war")
- Roman adage
Si vis pacem, para pacem ("If you want peace, prepare for peace")
- Inscription on the ceremonial pen used to sign the Kellogg-Briand
Pact
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INTRODUCTION
The Kellogg-Briand Pact has gotten a bum rap. That bold 1928
agreement, formally known as the General Treaty for the Renunciation
of War as an Instrument of National Policy,' represented the height of
post-World War I idealism. Under it, the leading powers of the day,
with the United States in the vanguard, condemned recourse to war and
pledged themselves to resort only to pacific means for the resolution of
all their future disputes.
Unfortunately, the treaty has been widely derided for a generation
as foolhardy in the extreme. Critics have portrayed Kellogg-Briand as
the ultimate illustration of legal and diplomatic hubris, in pretending
that something meaningful could be accomplished by purporting to
"outlaw" a phenomenon as pervasive as international combat. We can't
simply legislate this scourge away, proclaim the realists; idealistically
waving a piece of solemnly signed parchment did not prevent World
War II, and it would be similarly ineffectual against any modem
outbreak of hostilities, too.
Such harsh assessments have some merit; Kellogg-Briand can
seem quixotic when viewed with the hindsight of nearly a century of
1. See generally General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National
Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (entered into force Jul. 24, 1929)
[hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact].
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unrelenting, increasingly bloody, often widespread, war. But this article
argues that Kellogg-Briand was, in truth, a great success - it marked a
crucial turning point in the intellectual history of warfare, if not a
watershed in its actual conduct. In earlier years - into World War I -
war was widely regarded as something inevitable, an ineluctable
phenomenon of the human condition. War was an expensive and nasty
business, to be sure; it was uncomfortable and possibly fatal, but it was
inherent in life, part of the "settled order of things," much as a harsh,
cold winter might be. Neither circumstance was, as a practical matter,
avoidable; neither needed a "justification"; certainly neither was subject
to close or effective regulation by law.
In the inter-war period, however, attitudes around the world about
war were transformed. Populations and their leaders came to see
warfare as something extraordinary, something subject to human
volition. Especially (but not only) in the democracies, a new
appreciation grew that war could, and should, be controlled and
regulated; that states should not resort to war easily and for transient
reasons. Most dramatically, the leading statesmen of the era proclaimed
that going to war required a certain type of justification - in particular,
it must have an acceptable legal rationale.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact - originally proposed modestly as a
bilateral France-United States accord, but quickly expanded to embrace
dozens of key states all around the world - played a central role in that
transformation. This short instrument - still in force today, although
largely superseded by the Charter of the United Nations2 - captured the
zeitgeist and substantially deepened and broadened its pervasive
influence. Kellogg-Briand is a political, social, and legal inflection
point - it catalyzed a lasting change in the way people and states think,
talk, and act about war.
This article further argues that the time has come to extend that
success to an additional realm, to adapt Kellogg-Briand to twenty-first
century conditions and needs, by proposing a "nuclear version" of the
monumental accord. Under that structure, the states of the world would
unite to renounce nuclear war in particular; to declare that they will not
resort to, or threaten, that apocalypse; to insist that they will always find
alternative mechanisms for resolving international disputes; and -
exceeding the accomplishments of Kellogg-Briand - to undertake
specific steps, unilaterally and in concert, to reduce the likelihood of
any outbreak of nuclear hostilities. The article proceeds as follows:
2. See generally Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No.
993, 3 Bevans 1153 [hereinafter U.N. Charter].
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After this introduction, Section I provides an in-depth analysis of
the text of the Kellogg-Briand accord, dissecting its provisions and
noting both what it includes and what its drafters intentionally or
unconsciously omitted. The drafting architecture of the document
reflects its era; it is not styled as modem treaties on such critical topics
would be today, but there are lessons nonetheless.
Section II then provides more background about the evolution of
the treaty, noting its kindred antecedents and numerous other
contemporaneous instruments pursuing similar objectives. It also
describes several subsequent lawmaking tools, including a chain of like-
minded "confidence-building" accords that reaches into the modem era,
and critically assesses their impact. This part of the discussion
concludes by summarizing the key features of Kellogg-Briand,
highlighting a number of aspects that resonate into contemporary arms
control efforts.
Next, Section III turns to nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation
and the specter of nuclear war. It focuses, in particular, on the potential
military, legal, and political "usability" of nuclear weapons, and on a
series of "negative security assurances" and "no first use" pledges,
through which the states that possess nuclear weapons have undertaken
(more or less) to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear
weapons against states that have foregone their own possible nuclear
aspirations. It suggests that the world already has, to some extent,
promulgated something akin to a partial "nuclear version" of Kellogg-
Briand, but without the deliberative process and the comprehensive,
negotiated text that would make it most meaningful.
Section IV then presents the heart of the matter: a proposed new
treaty to renounce nuclear war as an instrument of national policy. The
draft text includes numerous footnotes that explain the provisions,
highlight the drafter's options, and cite precedents. The accompanying
discussion elaborates multifarious suggested steps to "operationalize"
the outlawry of nuclear war - features of a type that were notably absent
from Kellogg-Briand - and to insinuate the commitments into the
practices and plans of the nuclear weapons-possessing countries.
Finally, Section V offers some concluding observations. Overall,
the thesis of the article is that states should now commit, with renewed
vigor, to the imperative of avoiding nuclear war, and they should
undertake immediate, legally binding steps to reduce the likelihood of
that civilization-threatening catastrophe. These measures would
complement the "Getting to Zero" campaign for global nuclear
disarmament, but could and should be undertaken independently and
promptly, even if the ultimate objective remains elusive. In short, a new
[Vol. 42:1
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approach to nuclear weapons - inspired by the 1928 cognitive shift
established in Kellogg-Briand - should now be reflected in international
law, moving the world in a safer, more secure direction.
I. PARSING THE TEXT OF THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT
Kellogg-Briand does not look like a modem arms control treaty.
The official text of the instrument is largely "procedural," in identifying
the participating states and their respective representatives. 3  The
document includes four preambular paragraphs; 4 only two "operational"
articles;5 and a third "boilerplate" article describing the procedures for
ratification, accession, and entry into force. 6  The two operational
3. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, at introduction (the treaty records the names of
the plenipotentiaries who negotiated the instrument on behalf of the nine participating
sovereigns: Germany, the United States, Belgium, France, Great Britain [with separate
recognition of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ireland and India], Italy,
Japan, Poland, and Czechoslovakia).
4. The preamble describes the parties as
"[d]eeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of
mankind; Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation
of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end
that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their
peoples may be perpetuated; Convinced that all changes in their
relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and
be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory
Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by
resort to war a should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty;
and Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other nations of
the world will join in this humane endeavor and by adhering to the
present Treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their peoples within
the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting the civilized nations
of the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their
national policy."
Id. at preamble (italics added).
5. Article I provides: "The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of
their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one
another." Article II provides: "The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or
solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be,
which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means." Id. arts. I-Il.
6. Article III provides:
"The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties
named in the Preamble in accordance with their respective constitutional
requirements, and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their
several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at
Washington. This Treaty shall, when it has come into effect as
prescribed in the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be
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articles, each consisting of just a single sentence, combine for only
seventy-eight words.7 There are but five active verbs.
In contrast, arms control treaties today are behemoths, 8
incorporating expansive provisions that specify the obligations with
precision, often accompanied by reams of exquisitely crafted legal
definitions. 9  Modem negotiators elaborate the exact scope of the
undertakings and provide detailed timetables for the mandated actions. °
They frequently create new international organizations to oversee and
implement the agreement, and they specify all the institutional
necessary for adherence by all the other Powers of the world. Every
instrument evidencing the adherence of a Power shall be deposited at
Washington and the Treaty shall immediately upon such deposit become
effective as between the Power thus adhering and the other Powers
parties hereto. It shall be the duty of the Government of the United
States to furnish each Government named in the Preamble and every
Government subsequently adhering to this Treaty with a certified copy
of the Treaty and of every instrument of ratification or adherence. It
shall also be the duty of the Government of the United States
telegraphically to notify such Governments immediately upon the
deposit with it of each instrument of ratification or adherence."
Id. art. III.
7. James T. Shotwell, one of the leading advocates for the outlawry movement
culminating in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, commented that "[s]eldom had so important an
event so little text behind it or so direct and simple a history." JAMES T. SHOTWELL, WAR AS
AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY AND ITS RENUNCIATION IN THE PACT OF PARIS 189
(Harcourt Brace & Co. 1929).
8. Consider, for comparison, three major modern arms control agreements, the 1991
START I nuclear weapons treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union (Treaty on
the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Jul. 31, 1991, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 102-20) [hereinafter START I]; the multilateral 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention (Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC.
No. 103-219, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317) [hereinafter CWC]); and the multilateral 1996
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Sept. 10, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439 (not in force)
[hereinafter CTBT]. START I includes nineteen articles, as well as six attached protocols,
an annex of thirty-eight "agreed statements," and several other related instruments; the
CWC includes twenty-four articles, three annexes, and other documents; and the CTBT
includes seventeen articles, two annexes, a protocol and other items. But see Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty, U.S.-Russ., May 24, 2002, 944 U.N.T.S. 3 (demonstrating a
very brief U.S.-Russia arms control treaty that incorporated provisions of START I).
9. See, e.g., START I, supra note 8, at Annex on Terms and Their Definitions
(defining 124 terms); CWC, supra note 8, art. II (defining fourteen terms).
10. See, e.g., START I, supra note 8, art. II (requiring parties to reduce nuclear
weapons in three stages, with benchmarks at three, five, and seven years); CWC, supra note
8, at Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A)C. 17 (specifying the timetable
for destruction of chemical weapons, with interim deadlines at two, five, seven, and ten
years).
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arrangements. I I  Importantly, weapons-related treaties nowadays
demonstrate fastidious attention to provisions for "verification" of
parties' compliance with the commitments, and drafters stay at the
bargaining table until they have hammered out minute details about data
reporting, confirmatory inspections, and mechanisms for resolution of
disputes.12 Unsurprisingly, these modem arms control agreements are
prolix: the 1991 START I Agreement, for example, is 257 pages long;
the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention ("CWC") runs to ninety-seven
pages; and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ("CTBT") is sixty-
one pages. 13
The gestation period for these documents reflects their length and
overall state of development. The Kellogg-Briand pact was crafted in
about eight months, via a series of exchanges of diplomatic notes; 14 it
entered into force eleven months after signature.' 5  In contrast, the
United States and the Soviet Union brokered START I over a period of
nine years; 16 the negotiation of the CWC required only a slightly less
extended process;' 7 and the CTBT talks consumed about two and one
half years. 18  After signature, the hiatus before entry into force for
START I was three and one half years; 19 for the CWC, more than four
11. See, e.g., START 1, supra note 8, art. XV (establishing a Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission); CWC, supra note 8, art. VIII (establishing the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons); CTBT, supra note 8, art. II (establishing the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization).
12. See, e.g., START I, supra note 8, art. XI; CWC, supra note 8, at Annex on
Implementation and Verification; CTBT, supra note 8, art. IV.
13. Page lengths are taken from THOMAS GRAHAM, JR. & DAMIEN J. LAVERA,
CORNERSTONES OF SECURITY: ARMS CONTROL TREATIES IN THE NUCLEAR ERA (2003)
(START I is found on pages 889-1145; CWC is found on pages 1170-1266; and CTBT is
found on pages 1380-1440). Published in this format, the Kellogg-Briand Pact would be
less than one page.
14. HANS WEHBERG, THE OUTLAWRY OF WAR: A SERIES OF LECTURES DELIVERED
BEFORE THE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE HAGUE AND IN THE INSTITUT
UNIVERSITAIRE DE HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALES AT GENEVA 72-74, 78 (Edwin H.
Zeydel trans., 1931).
15. The Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed on August 27, 1928 and entered into force on
July 24, 1929. Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928, YALE UNIV. AVALON PROJECT, available at
http://www.yale.cdu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)[hereinafter
YALE UNIV. AVALON PROJECT].
16. GRAHAM, JR. & LAVERA, supra note 13, at 884-85 (START negotiations began in
July 1982; the treaty was signed on July 31, 1991).
17. Id. at 1168-70 (CWC negotiations began in earnest in 1984; the treaty was signed
on January 13, 1993).
18. Id. at 1377-79 (CTBT negotiations opened in early 1994; the treaty was signed on
September 24, 1996).
19. Id. at 885-87 (START I was signed on July 31, 1991 and entered into force on
2014]
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years; 20 and the CTBT is still not in force, despite having been opened
for signature on September 24, 1996.21
Kellogg-Briand thus manifests the benefits and disadvantages of
brevity. In it, the parties (acting "in the names of their respective
peoples" '22) "condemn recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies, and [reciprocally] renounce it as an instrument of
national policy. '23  They further agree that all disputes or conflicts
among themselves, of whatever nature or origin, shall be resolved
exclusively via "pacific means. 24
And that's essentially it. The treaty does not define "war" or
explain exactly what it means to condemn or renounce it; it does not
enlighten the reader regarding the notion of rejecting war specifically
"as an instrument of national policy." 25  Importantly (as elaborated
December 5, 1994).
20. Id. at 1170 (CWC was signed on January 13, 1993 and entered into force on April
29, 1997).
21. Id. at 1379 (date of signature of CTBT).
22. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, art. I; see Edward A. Harriman, The Effect of
the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, 9 B.U. L. REV. 239, 240 (1929) (noting that this is a novel phrase
in treaties; it has no legal effect, but symbolically suggests a change in the general theory of
statehood, with governments now acting as agents of their people).
23. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, art. I; see WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 82-83
(arguing that this language in the Kellogg-Briand Pact amounts to "outlawing" war; the
phrase "'outlawry of war' is hardly more than a catch-word repeated by everyone," but the
vocabulary of condemnation and renunciation expresses more clearly what is desired);
SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 103, 07 (discussing the American origins of the concept of
"outlawry," and its modification by Briand).
24. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, art. II.
25. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 76, 85, 98-99 (noting that this phrase could be
interpreted to permit a war undertaken for a purpose other than "national policy," such as a
means of "international policy," to assert a "religious" dogma or a philosophy of life, or to
crush the communist Soviet Union); see Harriman, supra note 22, at 246 (arguing that war
"as an instrument of national policy" includes all wars undertaken in pursuance of national
claims or in promotion of national interests, other than wars of self-defense); DIPLOMATIC
NOTE FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONTAINING ITS ADHESION TO THE PEACE PACT,
AUGUST 31, 1928, reprinted in J.W. WHEELER-BENNETT, INFORMATION ON THE
RENUNCIATION OF WAR 1927-1928, at 181, 184 (1928) (official comments of Soviet Union,
objecting to the "national policy" phrase in the Kellogg-Briand Pact and asserting that all
wars should be forbidden, including those undertaken for the purpose of oppression of
national liberation movements); DAVID HUNTER MILLER, THE PEACE PACT OF PARIS: A
STUDY OF THE BRIAND-KELLOGG TREATY 38-42 (1928) (contrasting the early French focus
on renouncing wars of aggression with the U.S. focus on war as an instrument of policy);
ROBERT H. FERRELL, PEACE IN THEIR TIME: THE ORIGINS OF THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT 66
(1968) (suggesting that the phrase "as an instrument of national policy" might have
originated as a derivative from the famous dictum of Karl von Clausewitz that war is an
instrument of policy, a continuation of politics by other means); SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at
209-19 (emphasizing that the structure of Kellogg-Briand amounts to "defining war without
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below) the negotiators fully appreciated that "defensive" war - waged
in opposition to an enemy's aggression - would remain legitimate, yet
they never alluded to that distinction in the text, and nowhere attempted
to explicate the crucial offensive/defensive bifurcation. Kellogg-Briand
has no provisions for verification or enforcement of compliance; there is
no institutional mechanism to monitor parties' performance or inflict
coordinated sanctions on violators. Moreover, the treaty did nothing to
mitigate the vast and growing war-making capabilities of its parties - it
has no arms limitation or reduction provisions. Nor did it specify or
suggest what is included in the obligatory "pacific means" or create any
new dispute-resolution institutions or avenues.
The treaty does specify some of the legal procedural provisions
that are now common in modem agreements - it requires ratification by
the original signatories and allows other states to join subsequently as
well, and it entrusts to the United States the specified duties of a
depositary26 - but it is bereft of any provisions for duration, withdrawal,
or amendment.
Kellogg-Briand was ratified by its original fifteen parties and by
thirty-two others by July 24, 1929, when it entered into force; eight
more joined shortly thereafter.27 Today, the treaty has seventy parties,
including representatives from every continent except Antarctica.28
The most significant sleight-of-hand in crafting Kellogg-Briand
was the juxtaposition of the seemingly "absolute" rhetoric (apparently
renouncing all war without exception or limitation) together with a sub
silentio preservation of a right to respond with force against a
neighbor's unprovoked aggression, and even a recognition of the
obligations, imposed by other balance-of-power agreements of the age,
to come to the aid, by military means if necessary, of an allied state that
had been victimized by an enemy's unwarranted use of military force.29
a definition.").
26. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, art. III.
27. YALE UNIV. AVALON PROJECT, supra note 15.
28. Treaties in Force 2013, U.S. DEP'T ST. at 467, available at http://www.state.gov-
documents/organization/218912.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (listing treaties in force for
the United States on January 1, 2013).
29. See WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 34-36, 73-77, 85 (treaty negotiators agreed that
defensive war would be permitted, without reflecting that consensus in the text of the
document); Diplomatic note from Mr. Kellogg to M. Claudel, February 27, 1928, reprinted
in WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 85; General Pact for the Renunciation of War:
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 70th Cong. 2 (Dec. 7 and 11, 1928)
(statement of Frank B. Kellogg, Secretary of State), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th century/kbhear.asp (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter
Hearings] (affirming that a party to the Locarno Treaty could lawfully come to the aid of a
2014]
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In addition, the participants understood that other important "escape
hatches" persisted - the United Kingdom made clear that it would
continue to fulfill what it regarded as special obligations regarding its
vast overseas empire, 30 and the United States retained Monroe Doctrine
rights that might seem inconsistent with complete outlawry of war. 3 1
But the text nowhere addresses these ineffable complexities. 32
II. THE ANTECEDENTS AND SEQUELAE OF KELLOGG-BRIAND
How did the world get to the 1928 treaty? The social history of the
convention was, of course, grounded in the trauma of World War I - the
supposed "war to end all wars" that did not quite work out that way.
Three factors, in particular, stand out. First, the epochal horror and
absurdity of that senseless blood-letting - the planet stumbling into a
conflagration that seemingly no one wanted and no one benefitted from
- propelled a consciousness that future pyrrhic conflicts: a) must be
avoided and b) could be avoided.33 Warfare had become so devastating,
treaty partner who had been attacked; the Kellogg-Briand Pact would not inhibit that act of
cooperative self-defense, but would also not require the United States to join it); see also
Vilho Harle, The Implementation of Peace Ideas: The Case of Outlawry of War, 10 HIST.
EUR. IDEAS 677, 684 (1989) (arguing that because the Kellogg-Briand Pact permitted
defensive war, "it was a total failure" for the idea of outlawry.)
30. See SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 200-08 (discussing the "British Monroe
Doctrine"); WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 77, 86; WHEELER-BENNETr, supra note 25, at 36-
40; Diplomatic Note Reply of the British Government, May 19, 1928, reprinted in
WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 115; Hearings, supra note 29, at 4 (Kellogg
describing the British position on defending interests throughout the empire); FERRELL,
supra note 25, at 180.
31. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 85 ("There is also no doubt that America does not
look upon disputes concerning the Monroe Doctrine as matters of purely national policy.");
see Harriman, supra note 22, at 249 (noting that the report of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee interpreting the Kellogg-Briand Pact asserted that the Monroe Doctrine is part of
the U.S. system of national defense); see Hearings, supra note 29, at 10-11; Congressional
Record vol. 70-a, 70th Cong. 2, Jan. 15, 1929, p. 1730 (quoting report of Senate Foreign
Relations Committee).
32. Hearings, supra note 29, at 6 (colloquy between Senator Reed and Secretary
Kellogg regarding the reliance upon diplomatic notes to alter the plain meaning of the
treaty); Henry Cabot Lodge, The Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact: A Contemporary Criticism,
TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG 2 (Dec. 1928), available at http://teachingameican
history.org/ibrary/document/the-kellogg-briand-peace-pact-a-contemporary-criticis
m-1928-29/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (criticizing the use of diplomatic notes, sent prior to
conclusion of the treaty, as expressions of reservations to the text).
33. J.M. WINTER, THE EXPERIENCE OF WORLD WAR I, at 202-21 (Oxford Univ. Press
1989) (1988); SAMUEL HYNES, A WAR IMAGINED, 269-352 (1990); Jennifer Llewellyn, Jim
Southey & Steve Thompson, The Human Cost of World War I, ALPHA HISTORY, available
at http://alphahistory.com/worldwarl/human-cost/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (estimating at
2014] A Nuclear Kellogg-Briand Pact
so expensive in blood and treasure, that it could no longer be sustained;
the habit or tradition of armed combat simply had to be abandoned.3 4
Populations could exert control, or at least influence, over their
sovereign decision-making, and could unite to banish too-easy recourse
to international violence.35
Second was a growing appreciation for the efficacy of international
law - a new belief that legal tools, institutions, and procedures could
play a leading role in the world's escape from warfare. The 1919
Covenant of the League of Nations36 provides the most vivid illustration
least twelve million deaths and twenty million serious injuries from World War I, as well as
a significant social psychological sense of loss); John Simkin, Financial Cost of the First
World War, SPARTACUS EDUC. (Sept. 1997). available at http://spartacus-
educational.com/FWWcosts.htrn (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (calculating a total of over
$185 billion costs of World War I to the combatant states). But see MICHAEL HOWARD, THE
INVENTION OF PEACE: REFLECTIONS ON WAR AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 55-59 (2000)
(arguing that World War I was not "accidental"; many people welcomed it with
enthusiasm).
34. SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 36 (asserting that war "is no longer a safe instrument
for statesmanship . . . it is too dangerous to employ."); Akira Iriye, The Globalizing of
America, 3 CAMBRIDGE HIST. AM. FOREIGN REL. 103 (1993) (describing the peace
movement of the 1920s as a global "hegemonic ideology"); Jacob Heilbrunn, The Case for
Normal Angell, NAT'L INT. (Sept. - Oct. 2013).
35. SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 14-15 (discussing the "recognized principle of
international law" in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that a sovereign state "is
entirely free to strike at any adversary or to work its will by force and to accept no curb
upon its power save only such as it may agree to in the exercise of its very sovereignty.");
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1,
36 (1946) (explaining that prior to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, a central idea of international
law was that a state had the right to resort to war not only to defend its legal rights, but to
destroy the legal rights of others; according to Machiavelli, any war which is necessary is
just); Robert H. Jackson, The Legal Basis of Our Defense Course: We Are Creating
Important Precedents (March. 27, 1941), available at
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/1941-03-27a.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)
(arguing that under the traditional view, there is no law to keep the peace, so all wars are
legal; this view was swept away in the twentieth century); FERRELL, supra note 25, at 14
(observing that "The 'intrusion' of public opinion into foreign policy nonetheless was a
notable fact of the period after the 1918 Armistice, which professional diplomats had to
reckon with whether they liked it or not."); John Norton Moore, Strengthening World
Order: Reversing the Slide to Anarchy, 4 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1,9 (1989) (saying that
Kellogg-Briand "reflected a fundamental shift in the history of conflict management that
may have been the single most important intellectual leap in history."); Barry Kellman, Of
Guns and Grotius, 7 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 465 (2014) (surveying evolving trends
in legal history regarding international warfare); WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 32 (suggesting
that education of American and global public opinion became a moral force strongly
promoting the Kellogg-Briand Pact); see also WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 2-5 (discussing
the ancient "just war" tradition, which maintained that a just war had to have a just cause).
36. See generally Treaty of Versailles Part 1, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 235, 13 A.J.I.L.
Supp. 151 [hereinafter League of Nations Covenant]; see also James Barros, The League of
Nations and Disarmament, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT 605
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of this conviction. That instrument not only established the first
permanent global security institutions (a Council of leading states,
supported by a more inclusive Assembly and a permanent Secretariat),37
it specified that any war or threat of war would be an emergency of
concern to all states; 38 that mandatory dispute resolution procedures
would apply to all discord that might lead to a rupture of the peace;39
and that a three-month "cooling off period" would have to intervene
before an aggrieved state could resort to war.40  These sinews of legal
process, it was hoped, could abate any rush to war, providing additional
opportunities for diplomacy to intervene, and could deter aggression by
assembling a staunch front of nations united in opposition.4
Another critical manifestation of the newfound affinity for law was
the burgeoning "outlawry" movement in the United States and
elsewhere.42 Faith grew that a public declaration that war was now
illegitimate could make a difference - that the labels and concepts of
law were impactful. The hypotheses that war should be officially
condemned as "illegal," and that such a designation mattered, were hot
topics in public international discourse, and various drafts of an
outlawry instrument were eagerly circulated and vigorously debated.43
(Richard Dean Bums ed., 1993).
37. League of Nations Covenant, supra note 36, arts. 2, 4.
38. Id. art. 11.
39. Id. arts. 12, 13, 15.
40. Id. art. 12.
41. Moore, supra note 35, at 7 (noting that under the Covenant of the League of
Nations, "the lawfulness of resort to war was primarily defined in procedural terms.").
42. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 5-9 (describing peace and outlawry movements just
before and after World War 1); id at 17-20 (discussing the origins of the American outlawry
movement); FERRELL, supra note 25, at 31-37; Sandi E. Cooper & Lawrence S. Wittner,
Transnational Peace Movements and Arms Control, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA ARMS CONTROL &
DISARMAMENT 491 (Richard Dean Bums ed., 1993); Harle, supra note 29, at 678 (asserting
that "[t]he movement for the complete outlawry of war originated in the United States.").
43. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 7-8 (describing early draft treaties); id at 64-67
(discussing prominent proposed outlawry treaty drafted by American professors); FERRELL,
supra note 25, at 86-87 (describing catalytic drafting role of American professors James T.
Shotwell and Joseph P. Chamberlain); SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 53-70, 271-78
(presenting influential early draft outlawry treaty); see also Aristide Briand, Speech at the
Signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Aug. 27, 1928) (official translation), reprinted in
WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 171, 174 (emphasizing that war, which had
previously been a "divine right" and an "attribute of sovereignty" was now being deprived
of its legitimacy; emphasizing that solemn international legal process constituted "a direct
blow to the institution of war, even to its very vitals."); Frank B. Kellogg, Address to the
Council on Foreign Relations, New York (Mar. 15, 1928), available at
http://www.foreignafairs.com/articles/68889/frank-b-kellogg-secretary-of-state/the-war-
prevention-policy-of-the-united-states [hereinafter Kellogg Address to the Council on
Foreign Relations] (noting that treaties alone cannot "afford a certain guarantee against
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Third, it is noteworthy that the contemplated legal and political
undertakings were to be public and multilateral. Reflecting the first of
President Woodrow Wilson's celebrated 1918 "Fourteen Points"
("Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at"44), this notion rejected
backroom transactions and private balance-of-power bargaining
between selected state partners. Self-serving "special deals" between
particular sovereigns were suspect - this was one of the leading reasons
why the United States insisted upon expanding the original French
proposal for a bilateral treaty into the global Kellogg-Briand accord.45
A. Three Types ofAnti- War Treaties.
The first decades of the twentieth century therefore proved a fertile
period for the progressive development of international law in
opposition to war. Three noteworthy streams of international
agreements emerged (with some documents contributing to more than
one objective), and each resonates into the modem era: dispute
resolution, disarmament, and outlawry.
First, the era witnessed a vivid flowering of alternative dispute-
resolution mechanisms and fora. For example, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration - "the first global mechanism for the settlement of disputes
between states ' 46 - was established in 1900, pursuant to the First Hague
Peace Conference. A companion institution, the Permanent Court of
International Justice - the first "world court" - was created as part of
those conflicts between nations," but asserting that legal implements help the world make
great strides toward pacific adjustments of international disputes); Joseph Preston Baratta,
The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Outlawry of War, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA ARMS CONTROL &
DISARMAMENT 695, 699 (Richard Dean Burns ed., 1993) (noting that supporters likened the
outlawry of war to the abolition of dueling, which had once been commonplace, but
eventually lost its "aura of honor" and was finally "put down as an odious abuse.").
44. Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, Address to the Joint Session of
Congress: Fourteen Points (Jan. 8, 1918), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
20th century/wilsonl4.asp (last visited Jan. 9, 2015) [hereinafter President Woodrow
Wilson, Fourteen Points]. Point I states "[o]pen covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after
which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall
proceed always frankly and in public view" and the first paragraph of the presentation
introducing the fourteen points asserts that the day of "secret covenants entered into in the
interest of particular governments" is gone by. Id.
45. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 72-73; WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 20-26.
46. Permanent Court of Arbitration: History, PERMANENT CT. ARBITRATION, available
at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1044 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); The
Court: History, INT'L CT. JUST., available at http://www.icj-cij.org/court/
index.php?pl=l&p2=l (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (tracing the history of international
arbitration to the 1794 Jay Treaty between the United States and Great Britain; observing
that the name "permanent court" does not accurately describe the arbitration institution).
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the Covenant of the League of Nations, becoming operational in 1922.47
International arbitration of all types and formats was greatly in fashion
in this period, with a series of multilateral and bilateral engagements
committing countries to pursue exclusively non-violent reconciliation.48
For the United States, a flurry of "Bryan treaties" (named for Secretary
of State William Jennings Bryan, who fostered the negotiations,
beginning in 1913) ultimately grew to forty-eight international
agreements binding the parties to conciliation processes and to refrain
from resorting to hostilities while talks were pending.49
Second, regarding disarmament, Wilson's fourth "Point," as
elaborated in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,
recognized that "the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of
national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national
safety." 50 The most prominent successes in this sector were the 1921-22
Washington Naval Conference and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.51 The
Washington Conference generated a fistful of interlocking treaties
limiting the naval assets of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and
other key players, principally by establishing a 5:5:3 ratio for the
tonnage that the three chief protagonists could deploy. 52 This
47. The Court: History, INT'L CT. JUST., available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?pl=l&p2=1 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); League of Nations
Covenant, supra note 36, art. 14; Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1031; T.S. 993.
48. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 14 (discussing several treaties concluded in the 1920s
among European states containing provisions for mandatory arbitration to resolve disputes);
Manley 0. Hudson, The Inter-American Treaties of Pacific Settlement, FOREIGN AFF. (Oct.
1936) (describing arbitration and conciliation treaties establishing a system of pacific
settlement for the Americas); David J. Hill, The Second Peace Conference at The Hague, I
AM. J. INT'L L. 671, 681-84 (1907) (listing arbitration treaties).
49. Bryan Treaties, in WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, (2nd ed. 2005) (also
noting that few disputes were actually submitted to these arbitral procedures); Harold
Josephson, Outlawing War: Internationalism and the Pact of Paris, 3 DIPLOMATIC HIST.
377, 383 (Oct. 1979) (reporting that President Hoover negotiated twenty-five arbitration
treaties and seventeen conciliation treaties); see Hudson, supra note 48; Kellogg Address to
the Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 43 (discussing eighteen Bryan treaties then in
force, as well as two multilateral conciliation treaties with Central and South American
states).
50. President Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points, supra note 44, at point IV; League of
Nations Covenant, supra note 36, art. 8.
51. See lriye, supra note 34, at 78 (concluding that the 1920s was the only recent
decade in which actual arms reductions took place; "there was in the world less armament in
1929 than in 1919.").
52. Treaty for the Limitation of Armament, Feb. 6, 1922, 25 T.S. 201 (also referred to
as the Five Power Treaty/Agreement); The Washington Naval Conference, 1921-1922, U.S.
DEP'T ST., available at http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921 -1936/naval-conference (last
visited Jan. 9, 2015); 1921-1922 Washington Naval Conference, GLOBAL SECURITY,
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instrument led to the scrapping of several capital ships by each country
and the cancellation of plans for what would otherwise have become an
expensive and destabilizing arms race in battleship construction. 3 The
Geneva Protocol,54 responding to the particularly loathsome use of
chemical weapons in the trenches of World War I,55 created a
prohibition on "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of
bacteriological methods of warfare." 56  It attracted widespread
adherence and remained for half a century the world's strongest legal
bulwark against those insidious forms of combat.
5 7
Finally, the particular concept of outlawing or renouncing war was
expressed in several treaties, resolutions, and other commitments.
Noteworthy in this regard were the 1925 Locarno treaties,58 the most
important of which (the "Rhineland Pact"59) incorporated reciprocal
promises by Germany and Belgium, and by Germany and France, "that
they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/naval-arms-control- 1921 .htm (last
visited Jan. 9, 2015); Thomas H. Buckley, The Washington Naval Limitation System 1921-
1939, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 369 (Richard Dean Bums
ed., 1993). In addition to the Five Power Treaty, separate overlapping agreements were
concluded as the Four Party Treaty, the Nine Power Treaty, and others. Under the Five
Power agreement, the United States and Great Britain were each allowed to deploy capital
ships totaling 525,000 tons displacement; Japan was allowed 315,000 tons, and Italy and
France 175,000 tons each. Additionally, battleships and aircraft carriers were limited in
size.
53. Iriye, supra note 34, at 75-78 (reporting that these agreements would result in the
United States destroying thirty of its forty-eight large ships (in being or under construction),
Britain would reduce its navy from forty-five to twenty warships, and Japan would destroy
seventeen of its twenty-seven warships).
54. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571
[hereinafter Geneva Protocol].
55. See generally L.F. HABER, THE POISONOUS CLOUD: CHEMICAL WARFARE IN THE
FIRST WORLD WAR (1986); ROBERT HARRIS & JEREMY PAXMAN, A HIGHER FORM OF
KILLING: THE SECRET HISTORY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (1982); JONATHAN
B. TUCKER, WAR OF NERVES: CHEMICAL WARFARE FROM WORLD WAR I TO AL-QAEDA
(2006); see also GRAHAM, JR. & LAVERA, supra note 13, at 7-8.
56. Geneva Protocol, supra note 54.
57. See GRAHAM, JR. & LAVERA, supra note 13, at 7-10. The Geneva Protocol was
eventually supplemented by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction), April 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015
U.N.T.S. 163, T.I.A.S. No. 8062 and the CWC, supra note 8.
58. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 32-40 (emphasizing the Locarno treaties as a major
accomplishment); FERRELL, supra note 25, at 48-49 (discussing the hopeful "spirit of
Locamo" generated by those treaties).
59. Treaty of Mutual Guarantee Between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain,
and Italy, Oct. 16, 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 305.
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each other," 60 with Great Britain and Italy acting as guarantors of the
peace.61 In the Western Hemisphere, the Fifth International Conference
of American States, meeting in Santiago, Chile in May 1923, adopted a
Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts, 62 and the sixth such conference, in
Havana in February 1928, passed two resolutions similarly expressing
the participants' unqualified condemnation and prohibition of war in
their mutual relations. 6
3
B. The Evolution of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
The peripatetic French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand (who had
shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1926 for his work on the Locarno
treaties64), attempted to build on that European success by proposing a
cognate U.S.-France peace bond.65 His interlocutor in the Coolidge
Administration, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, 66 welcomed the
initiative, but insisted upon multilateralizing it, to embrace all the key
international players of the era.67 A draft treaty quickly took shape, via
a series of diplomatic notes - Kellogg preferred correspondence to face-
to-face meetings, fearing that a formal conference would inevitably
engage legions of lawyers, who would jeopardize the enterprise by
burdening it with unnecessary details and complexity. 68
60. The Locarno Pact, AVALON PROJECT art. 2. (2008), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20thcentury/locarno_001.asp (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). These
commitments would not apply in the case of legitimate defense against an unprovoked act of
aggression. See id.
61. Id. arts. 1, 5. In case of a flagrant violation of article 2, the other parties to the
treaty agree to come to the aid of the victim. Id. art. 4 (3).
62. Treaty to Avoid or Prevent Conflicts between the American States, May 3, 1923,
33 L.N.T.S 25.
63. WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 25; WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 68-72;
Kellogg Address to the Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 43.
64. See Aristide Briand - Biographical, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, available at http://www.
nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/peace/laureates/1926/briand-bio.html (last visited Dec. 18,
2014); FERRELL, supra note 25, at 62-65.
65. See WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 64, 72-73; WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at
19; SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 41-52, 71-77; FERRELL, supra note 25, at 68-83; MILLER,
supra note 25, at 7-12.
66. See Biographies of the Secretaries of State: Frank Billings Kellogg, U.S. DEP'T
ST., available at http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/kellogg-frank-billings
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014); see FERRELL, supra note 25, at 79-83.
67. See WEHBERG, supra note 14 at 73-74; WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 21-
23.
68. See Hearings, supra note 29, at 4 (Kellogg explaining that a multilateral meeting
of lawyers "would be the end of any treaty"); SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 128-44
(describing the early Franco-American negotiations); MILLER, supra note 25, at 20-37, 154-
83 (French and U.S. diplomatic notes); WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25; YALE UNIV.
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When the draft treaty was ready for prime time, Kellogg circulated
it to two tiers of countries: first, those fifteen who would be stylized as
original High Contracting Parties, whose ratification would be required
for entry into force; 69 and second, a miscellaneous wider array, who
would be invited to affiliate immediately or at any subsequent time.7°
Remarkably, all the solicited first wave of countries joined on with
alacrity; few if any modifications in the original text of the document
were proposed. 71 The imperative for speed was pronounced, prompted
by agitation from national publics, who were well aware of the contents
and progress of the negotiations, and impatient that the articulation of a
basic outlawry agreement was taking so long. 72 In fact, when the Soviet
Union was invited to participate, among its complaints was the
apprehension that the Kellogg-Briand ratification process might be
unacceptably prolonged. Therefore, the Soviet Foreign Minister,
Maxim Litvinov, negotiated a companion instrument, joined by Estonia,
Latvia, Poland, and Romania, as well as the U.S.S.R., which
accomplished an immediate effectuation, on substantially identical
terms. This Litvinov Protocol entered into force on March 16, 1929,
four months before Kellogg-Briand.73
AVALON PROJECT, supra note 15 (collection of diplomatic notes leading to Kellogg-Briand
Pact).
69. The original participants were selected to reach the major powers and additional
states that had been engaged in conflicts with them, while not including so many states that
prompt conclusion and entry into force of the treaty would be delayed. See WEHBERG,
supra note 14, at 78-80; WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 43; SHOTWELL, supra note 7,
at 145-58, 172-76; MILLER, supra note 25, at 80-111.
70. See WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 78-79.
71. See WHEELER-BENNETr, supra note 25, at 28-51; WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 79;
FERRELL, supra note 25, at 138-43, 192-200; SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 192-93 (describing
British reaction). Russia asserted numerous complaints about the text of the agreement (its
failure to prohibit all war, its lack of disarmament commitments), but agreed to join.
SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 78-79; see Diplomatic Note from the Soviet Government
Containing its Adhesion to the Peace Pact, supra note 25. Many additional states signaled
their willingness to join soon; only Argentina and Brazil remained aloof. WEHBERG, supra
note 14, at 80.
72. See WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 52 (noting public criticism of perceived
dilatory policy of United Kingdom government dealing with Kellogg-Briand); SHOTWELL,
supra note 7, at vii, 83-92 (highlighting the growing power of public opinion); FERRELL,
supra note 25, at 177, 183-85.
73. See Protocol for the Immediate Entry into Force of the Treaty of Paris arts. 1-11,
Feb. 9, 1929, 89 L.N.T.S. 370. The Kellogg-Briand Pact is attached as an annex to the
Litvinov Protocol; the effect of the Protocol is to bring Kellogg-Briand into force as soon as
individual states ratify the Protocol, without waiting for all the original parties to the Pact to
ratify it. Id. arts. I, II. The Litvinov Protocol was later extended to include Turkey, Persia
and Lithuania. See WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 54-58; WEHBERG, supra note 14,
at 79.
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Subsequent lawmaking and interpretation7 4 regarding all three
themes of alternative dispute resolution, disarmament, and outlawry,
continued unabated for another decade, before being punctured by the
rise of Nazi and associated totalitarianism. Noteworthy
accomplishments included the 1928 General Act for Pacific Settlement
of International Disputes,7 5 the 1933 Argentine Anti-war Treaty of Non-
Aggression and Conciliation among the United States and Latin
American partners, 76 and others.77
C. The Post- World War I1 Legacy.
After World War II, including in the depths of the cold war,
reminders of the spirit of Kellogg-Briand can be discerned in a variety
of "confidence-building" measures (sometimes expanded into
transparency-, confidence-, and security-building measures).
Noteworthy in the roster of such accords would be bilateral U.S.-
U.S.S.R. instruments, such as the 1963 agreement to establish the
"hotline" and its 1971 and 1984 upgrades; 78 the 1971 Agreement on
74. In September 1934, the International Law Association, meeting in Budapest,
offered a weighty commentary of interpretation and reinforcement of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact, emphasizing the stringency of its prohibitions. See generally International Law
Association, Briand-Kellogg Pact of Paris, Budapest Articles of Interpretation, 20
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS Soc'y 205, 205-06 (1934); see also Josephson, supra note 49, at
381-82; Hersch Lauterpacht, The Pact of Paris and the Budapest Articles of Interpretation,
20 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC'Y 178 (1934).
75. See generally General Act for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Sept.
26, 1928, 71 L.N.T.S. 101 (replaced by 1949 revision).
76. See generally Anti-war Treaty of Non-aggression and Conciliation, Oct. 10, 1933,
U.S.T.S 906, 163 L.N.T.S. 394 (also known as the Saavedra Lamas Treaty, terminated and
replaced in 1948); see also Hudson, supra note 48.
77. See Philip C. Jessup, Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression, 33 AM. J.
INT'L L. Supp. 819, 824-25 (1939) [hereinafter Harvard Research] (concluding that of
seventy-one states in the world, sixty-nine had accepted obligations to refrain from resort to
armed force under some circumstances); id. at 848-52 (collecting treaties that deal with
aggression); id. at 872 (concluding that "practically every State of the world, except perhaps
Lichtenstein, Yemen, and one or two others of like magnitude, are parties to either the
Covenant of the League, the Pact of Paris or the Argentine Anti-War Pact.").
78. See generally Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a
Direct Communications Link, U.S.- U.S.S.R., June 20, 1963, 472 U.N.T.S. 163; Agreement
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Measures to Improve the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. Direct Communications Link, September 30,
1971, 806 U.N.T.S. 402; Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics to Expand the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Direct Communications Link,
July 17, 1984, available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4786.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
This sequence of agreements created, and sequentially upgraded, mechanisms for quick and
reliable communications between the superpowers, to reduce the dangers of accidents or
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Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War;79 the 1972
Incidents at Sea Agreement;80 the 1973 Prevention of Nuclear War
Agreement; 8 1 the 1987 Agreement on the Establishment of Risk
Reduction Centers; 82 and the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification
Agreement.8 3  Among multilateral instruments, the 1986 Stockholm
Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and
Disarmament in Europe84 and the associated Vienna Documents of 1990
and thereafter8 5 stand out.
These agreements, for the most part, do not require countries to
miscalculations that might cascade into nuclear war. See sources cited supra.
79. See generally Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear
War, U.S.- U.S.S.R., Sept. 30, 1971, 807 U.N.T.S. 57. This instrument included reciprocal
pledges to maintain and improve organizational and technical arrangements to prevent the
accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and to notify each other in case of
related incidents. See id.
80. See generally Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention
of Incidents on and over the High Seas, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 25, 1972, 852 U.N.T.S. 152.
This treaty addresses the problem of near-collisions between the states' ships and aircraft,
by adopting safety measures and signals and by avoiding provocative maneuvers. See id.
81. See generally Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, U.S.- U.S.S.R, June
22, 1973, 917 U.N.T.S. 86. In this agreement, the two countries stated their objective "to
remove the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons." Id. art. I. The two
countries also agreed, "that each Party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the
other Party." Id. art. II.
82. See generally Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers,
U.S.-U.S.S.R, Sept, 15, 1987, 1530 U.N.T.S 387. The Risk Reduction Centers supplement
the hotline agreements, which are reserved for use by heads of the two governments, by
providing a secure, reliable and routine mechanism for communication of non-crisis
information, including the frequent notifications that must be exchanged pursuant to nuclear
arms control agreements. See id.
83. See generally Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, U.S.-U.S.S.R, May 31, 1988, 27
I.L.M. 1200. Under this agreement, the parties provide twenty-four hours advance notice of
the planned date, launch site and impact area of any launch of an intercontinental ballistic
missile or submarine-launched ballistic missile. See id.
84. See generally Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe Convened in Accordance with the
Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Sept. 19, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 190. The Stockholm
Document contains a variety of measures such as notification of upcoming military
exercises, invitation of observers to monitor those exercises, and aerial and on-site
inspections. See id.
85. Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures, COM (1999) 1/99 final (Nov. 16, 1999). The Vienna Document called for
increased transparency of military assets and activities, annual exchanges of information,
and improved consultation procedures. See id.
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limit or reduce their armed forces or armaments; they do not directly
restrict participants' military deployments or operations. They do,
however, enhance regional and global stability and security by
committing the parties to a modicum of prudential self-restraint, mutual
respect, and concern for how their ambiguous actions might be
perceived by the other side; by reducing accidents, miscommunications,
and misunderstandings that could cascade into calamity; and by
instituting practices, exchanges, and transparency that can help reassure
nervous countries that their neighbors and erstwhile foes are not secretly
preparing an armed attack. 8
6
Kellogg-Briand was the pathbreaker for these agreements, and
reflected a remarkable degree of social consensus, inside the United
States and around the world. The U.S. Senate, for example, provided its
advice and consent to the treaty on January 16, 1929 by a resounding
vote of 85-1.87 The pact drew vigorous support from even the
"Irreconcilables," such as Idaho Republican Senator William E. Borah,
who had zealously opposed the Treaty of Versailles and U.S.
participation in the League of Nations, but who considered legal
abolition of warfare to be propitious. 88 Kellogg was awarded the Nobel
86. Confidence-building measures of various sorts are employed in a wide variety of
contexts, to promote peace and stability, even without directly reducing arms. See, e.g.,
U.S. Dep't of St., Rep. of the U.S. Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, 21 of the 2010 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty Review Conference Final Doc., U.S. DEP'T. ST. 12-14 (2014), available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225580.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)
[hereinafter Actions Report] (summarizing transparency and confidence-building measures
adopted by the United States and others in response to demands from non-nuclear
countries); U.S. Rep. to the Org. of American States on the Application of Confidence and
Security Building Measures for 2009 and 2010, AG/RES.2447, U.S. DEP'T. ST. (2011),
available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/18774l .htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Rep. of
the UN. Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building
Measures in Outer Space Activities, A/68/189, UNITED NATIONS (2013), available at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=A/68/189 (last visited Dec. I1, 2014);
Daryl Kimball, Open Skies Treaty at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS'N (Oct. 2012),
available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/openskies (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
87. Congressional Record vol. 70-a, 70th Cong. 2, Jan. 15, 1929, p. 1731 (Senate vote
on Kellogg-Briand); see FERRELL, supra note 25, at 252 (noting that John G. Blaine
(Republican from Wisconsin) was the lone dissenter); Josephson, supra note 49, at 378-79
(explaining that Kellogg-Briand united diverse political constituencies; it promoted the
interests of multiple factions); Herbert Hoover, U.S. President, Remarks Upon Proclaiming
the Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Kellogg-Briand Pact) (July 24, 1929)
(characterizing the treaty as "a proposal to the conscience and idealism of civilized nations.
It suggested a new step in international law, rich with meaning, pregnant with new ideas in
the conduct of world relations."); Baratta, supra note 43, at 703 (noting that the Kellogg-
Briand Pact was displayed in post offices across the United States, "creating the impression
that a historic event was afoot.").
88. JOHN CHALMERS VINSON, WILLIAM E. BORAH AND THE OUTLAWRY OF WAR 59-70,
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Peace Prize for his leadership of the treaty process, and was later
appointed to the Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ"). 9
The NGO community - perhaps best represented by Andrew Carnegie's
Endowment for International Peace, which had sponsored sequential
high-visibility iterations of an anti-war treaty - was never stronger.
90
President Calvin Coolidge enthused, as the Kellogg-Briand
negotiations neared conclusion:
Had an agreement of this kind been in existence in 1914, there is
every reason to suppose that it would have saved the situation and
delivered the world from all the misery which was inflicted by the great
war .... It holds a greater hope for peaceful relations than was ever
before given to the world. If those who are involved in it, having
started it will finish it, its provisions will prove one of the greatest
blessings ever bestowed upon humanity.
9 1
Barely a decade later, however, World War II - a different kind of
war, with different causes and stakes - dealt a lasting blow to the whole
concept of outlawry, and to Kellogg-Briand in particular.92 The treaty
continued to be frequently cited,93 and the spirit animating the peace
122-32, 149-75 (Univ. of Ga., 1st ed. 1957); William E. Borah, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
(2014), available at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/73799/William-E-Borah
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014); WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 18, 133 (reprinting one of Borah's
Senate resolutions in support of outlawry); see also FERRELL, supra note 25, at 33.
89. See Biographies of the Secretaries of State: Frank Billings Kellogg, supra note 66.
90. Carnegie founded the Endowment for International Peace in 1910, to "hasten the
abolition of war, the foulest blot upon our civilization." Carnegie at 100: A Century of
Impact, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT'L PEACE (2014), available at http://carnegie
endowment.org/about/?fa=centennial (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). Experts affiliated with
the Carnegie Endowment provided much of the public intellectual support for the concept of
outlawry of war and drafted alternative versions of a treaty. See Josephson, supra note 49,
at 379 (discussing contributions of James T. Shotwell and Joseph P. Chamberlain); see
WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 19; see FERRELL, supra note 25, at 21-23.
91. FERRELL, supra note 25, at 208 (Calvin Coolidge spoke about the Kellogg treaty in
Wassau, Wisconsin on August 15, 1928).
92. See Josephson, supra note 49, at 387-88 (as World War 11 approached, most
internationalists abandoned support for Kellogg-Briand, concluding that armed force was
required to protect international peace and security against the dictators); Iriye, supra note
34, at 131-48 (the rise of totalitarianism threatened democracies in ways that institutions
such as Kellogg-Briand could not address).
93. See Josephson, supra note 49, at 383 (U.S. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson
"invoked the Kellogg-Briand pact in the Sino-Russian conflict in Manchuria in 1929 and
then again in the Sino-Japanese conflict during the early 1930s."); id at 386 (President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Secretary of State Cordell Hull invoked the pact on numerous
occasions in the late 1930s); Jackson, supra note 35, at 7 (calling the Kellogg-Briand Pact a
cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and stating that the United States had invoked it
repeatedly); Baratta, supra note 43, at 696; Richard N. Current, Consequences of the
Kellogg Pact, in ISSUES AND CONFLICTS: STUDIES IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICAN
2014]
Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 42:1
movement never fully retreated, but it was never again the centerpiece
of international attention and diplomacy. After World War II, the
conceit of Kellogg-Briand provided essential intellectual and legal
underpinnings for the Nuremburg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals,
substantiating the doctrine of prosecuting aggressors for "crimes against
the peace. 94
In its ninth decade, however, the legacy of the Kellogg-Briand pact
is often portrayed as one of abject failure and misguided idealism - the
treaty is the poster child for those who would deride the whole concept
of marshaling legal instruments to help constrain pernicious national
behaviors. Of course we can't meaningfully outlaw war, skeptics laugh
- aspirational legal instruments are a weak reed against the tenacity of
determined evil-doers. Only armed might, backed by eternal vigilance,
counts for much in modern international confrontations; unverifiable
and unenforceable declarations are not worth the parchment they're
written on, and serve only to lull the soft-hearted into a false sense of
security.95 Even those inclined to be sympathetic with the ambitions of
the Kellogg-Briand enterprise tend to conclude, sadly, that it was
DIPLOMACY 210,212-15 (George L. Anderson ed., 1959).
94. Josephson, supra note 49, at 388 (allied prosecutors at Nuremburg emphasized the
crime of conspiring to wage aggressive war in violation of Kellogg-Briand); Baratta, supra
note 43, at 696-97; Quincy Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38,
54, (1947); Henry L. Stimson, The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law, 25 FOREIGN AFF.
179, 183-84 (Jan. 1947).
95. See, e.g., Richard Perle, Yes, Nukes: The Global Zero Utopia, WORLD AFFS. J.
(Mar./Apr. 2011), available at http://www.worldaffairsjoumal.org/article/yes-nukes-global-
zero-utopia (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (describing "the illusion created by Kellogg-Briand"
as one of the factors precipitating World War 11; asserting that utopianism does not make the
world more idealistic and may bring about the very evils the advocates are attempting to
eliminate; and comparing the current effort to abolish nuclear weapons to Kellogg-Briand);
Charles Krauthammer, The Age of Obama: Anno Domini 2, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 1,
2010), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/the-age-of-obama-anno-
domini-2 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (describing Kellogg-Briand as "an absurdity" and a
"useless treaty"); Andrei Shoumikhin & Baker Spring, Strategic Nuclear Arms Control for
the Protect and Defend Strategy, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 4, 2009), available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/05/strategic-nuclear-arms-control-for-the-
protect-and-defend-strategy (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (criticizing Kellogg-Briand as
"ambitious and ultimately unachievable," "utopian grandeur," flawed in confusing ends with
means, and giving the United States an "unfounded faith" that impeded effective response to
Japanese aggression; also comparing modem arms control initiatives to Kellogg-Briand);
Josephson, supra note 49, at 377 (noting the views of historians, journalists and
commentators who deride Kellogg-Briand as na'ive, feeble, a worthless piece of paper, or a
diplomatic charade); Matthew J. Morgan, A New Kellogg-Briand Mentality? The Anti-
Personnel Landmine Ban, 13 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 97, 98 (2002) (commenting
about Kellogg-Briand that "The futility of this endeavor cannot be exaggerated" and
criticizing the effort to ban land mines as reminiscent of it).
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largely a benighted, utopian failure. 96
D. Principal Attributes of Kellogg-Briand.
In concluding this section, the article attempts to extract some of
the key features of Kellogg-Briand that may be relevant for twenty-first
century conditions - especially nuclear conditions. These highlights
might not rise to the level of "lessons learned" - and the article certainly
does not contend that Kellogg-Briand was a flawless success - but there
are at least "suggestions" from the heady 1928 experiences about traits
that a nuclear version of the treaty might try to replicate (or to avoid).
1. Kellogg-Briand is Legally Binding.
The aspirations of the drafters were lofty and their rhetoric was
bold, and they chose to express their ambitions in the form of a written,
legally binding treaty, rather than a hortatory "agreement in principle," a
joint statement of intentions, or a series of grand policy speeches. 97
Legally binding tools are not necessarily more important or more
enduring, nor are they automatically more likely to be complied with,
but this choice is not merely one of style. 98 The formalities of law -
both international law and the domestic legal processes that individual
states must follow in order to affiliate - signify a special depth of
commitment and seriousness of purpose. 99
96. See FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, OUR FOREIGN POLICY: A DEMOCRATIC VIEW 573,
585 (1928) (emphasizing that "war cannot be outlawed by resolution alone"); Josephson,
supra note 49, at 385 (noting that prior to his election as president, Roosevelt considered
Kellogg-Briand to be harmless but unrealistic); Baratta, supra note 43, at 698.
97. Under Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty is "an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation." Here, the critical factor is that
Kellogg-Briand is "governed by international law." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties art. II, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331 (U.S. not a party).
98. Harriman, supra note 22, at 239, 252 (arguing that the legal effect of Kellogg-
Briand is not as important or interesting as its political effect, but is noteworthy
nonetheless); see Emily Cumberland, The End of Treaties? An Online Agora, AJIL
UNBOUND (Apr. 28, 2014), available at http://www.asil.org/blogs/end-treaties-online-agora
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (discussing the possible decline in formal treaties as a
mechanism of cooperation in international law); see also Treaty Survival, GEORGE WASH.
UNIV. (Apr. 9, 2014), available at http://www.law.gwu.edu/News/2013-
2014events/PagesTreatySurvival.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (panel discussion of
continued effectiveness of treaties in modern era).
99. See Circular 175 Procedure, U.S. DEP'T ST. (2014), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/c175/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (noting that in U.S.
practice, the Department of State oversees the "Circular 175 process," which determines
whether a particular international agreement will be structured as a legally binding
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Moreover, Kellogg-Briand was not just any treaty, but an
aggressively multilateral one, attracting the participation of virtually all
the critical global players, and it was a fully public enterprise, in which
civil society populations looked eagerly over the shoulders of the
drafters.' 00 The treaty both drew strength from, and reciprocally helped
reinforce, the world-wide, populist anti-war zeal.
2. Kellogg-Briand is, in Effect, a "No First Use" Commitment.
Despite sometimes being advertised as a comprehensive, full-scope
non-war undertaking, the true upshot of Kellogg-Briand is limited in
this important - and realistic - way. Although the text of the document
is not explicit, the parties were completely clear among themselves that
the function was to outlaw aggressive or offensive war; each state
necessarily retained the inherent right to defend itself and its allies.' 01
At the same time, the document utterly failed to define the core
distinction between (prohibited) offensive war and (permitted)
defensive engagement, or to offer any line-drawing assistance in
resolving what could frequently be problematic and intensely contested
international fact patterns. 10 2  Kellogg refused to attempt any
negotiations toward a definition of the term "aggression"' 3 - an effort
that would inevitably lead the diplomats down a hopeless rabbit hole' 0 4
instrument, and if so, whether it will be handled for domestic purposes as a treaty or an
executive agreement).
100. See WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 21-24 (noting rapid public and media
responses to the evolving negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact).
101. See WHEELER-BENNETr, supra note 25, at 107 (reprinting Frank B. Kellogg,
Speech to American International Law Association, Washington, D.C., April 29, 1928)
("There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in
any way the right of self-[defense].").
102. See WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 46-51 (describing the 1925 conflict between
Greece and Bulgaria that raised difficult issues in defining the distinction between offensive
and defensive war); id at 100-08 (discussing defensive war, war undertaken to sanction a
country, and war to punish aggression); id. at 81 (concluding that despite definitional
problems, the Kellogg-Briand Pact succeeded in reversing the burden of proof about the
legitimacy of a use of military force); see also WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 59
(noting that the Kellogg-Briand Pact permits the use of force "in the case of Great Britain, in
[defense] of certain places or strategic points which are vital to the safety of the Empire.").
103. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 72-76; WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 24-25;
Kellogg Address to the Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 43, at 90; Hearings, supra
note 29, at 8 (Kellogg testifying that "nobody on earth, probably, could write an article
defining 'self-defense' or 'aggressor' that some country could not get around"); see
Matthew Lippman, The History, Development and Decline of Crimes Against Peace, 36
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 957, 986-90 (2004).
104. See Harvard Research, supra note 77; see also Report of the Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression, infra note 120 (regarding the difficulty of negotiating text
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- and the Americans insisted that the treaty would not contain any
commitments (as in the Treaty of Versailles 0 5 and the Locarno Pact 10 6)
to come to the aid automatically of a state that found itself victimized by
another.' 07
3. Kellogg-Briand Does Not Address Disarmament, and Contains no
Implementation Mechanisms or Diplomatic Infrastructure.
Many of Kellogg-Briand's proponents earnestly advocated
disarmament, of course, seeing weapons programs as exorbitantly
expensive, wasteful and provocative; they wanted to rein in the
"merchants of death."' 0 8 But Kellogg-Briand is a specialized, single-
purpose instrument, content with the solo function of condemning
recourse to war; the arms reductions would be addressed separately, in a
different series of instruments. 10 9
In the same vein, it must be noted that Kellogg-Briand is also
bereft of specifications about the intended concrete meaning of a
general "renunciation" of war; it contains no subsidiary obligations
pursuant to which states would give operational content to the abstract
commitment. After joining the agreement, parties were not required to
concerning the definition of the crime of aggression for the International Criminal Court).
105. Under the League of Nations Covenant in Part I of the Treaty of Versailles, supra
note 36, Article II states that any war or threat of war is "declared to be a matter of concern
to the whole League [of Nations]," and Article 16 declares any state that resorts to
unwarranted war "shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all
other Members of the League." League of Nations Covenant, supra note 36, arts. 11, 16;
see WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 11, 22 (noting American resistance to the obligation
imposed upon members of the League of Nations to use force in response to aggression
against another member); Hearings, supra note 29, at 3-4 (colloquy between senators and
Secretary Kellogg regarding contrasting types of obligations in the Kellogg-Briand Pact and
other treaties of military alliance).
106. See WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 32-40 (analyzing parties' commitments to use
military power to enforce the Locarno commitments); WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at
32-33 (noting American suspicion of other treaties under which European states committed
to use military force to assist each other against aggression).
107. See Iriye, supra note 34, at 63, 69, 80 (noting varying opinions in the United
States regarding committing to participation in international affairs, especially regarding the
use of force); see also Lodge, supra note 32, at 3-5 (questioning the value of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact, if it does not really constitute a pledge of military support); Josephson, supra
note 49, at 380 (some saw Kellogg-Briand as a door that would open the United States to the
League of Nations and the world court); see also Current, supra note 93, at 221-23.
108. WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 97 ("The great importance of a radical disarmament
for the idea of the outlawry of war can hardly be overemphasized.").
109. The Soviet Union strongly complained that Kellogg-Briand should do more to
reduce arms; Foreign Minister Litvinov emphasized this as a priority. See Diplomatic Note
from the Soviet Government Containing Its Adhesion to the Peace Pact, reprinted in
WHEELER-BENNETT, supra note 25, at 181-87.
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undertake any particular follow-up steps to substantiate their act of
outlawry. The treaty does not indicate any possible day-to-day
measures that would assist in making international armed conflict less
likely or more avoidable, or create any "firebreaks" that could impede
adverse developments. Nor does the treaty establish any fresh
diplomatic infrastructure - no new organization or international
institutions are elicited.1 10
4. Kellogg-Briand Reinforces the Parties' Commitment to Peaceful
Dispute Resolution.
The one partial exception to the observation made in the
immediately preceding paragraph is the treaty's insistence that any
future disputes or conflicts shall be resolved exclusively via "pacific"
means.11 Again, Kellogg-Briand does not itself establish or enlarge
any international mechanisms for this purpose, but multiple companion
instruments had proliferated an array of judicial, arbitration, conciliation
and related services. These alternatives were intended to provide
practical, readily available surrogates for armed force in the resolution
of disputes (although, in practice, these opportunities were only rarely
exploited). 112
5. Kellogg-Briand is Reciprocal.
The treaty extends its protection only to states that join the club -
parties renounce war only "in their relations with one another."' 3 This,
of course, is a pregnant political choice, and the drafters expressed their
hope that all states would "join in this humane endeavor," ' 14 but it
would certainly have been possible to condemn all war, including war
110. Harriman, supra note 22, at 240 (arguing that Kellogg-Briand's condemnation of
war "is, of course, merely an expression of opinion and does not call for any action by the
parties.").
111. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, art. 11; see also Harriman, supra note 22, at
243-46 (arguing that in this context, "'pacific' does not mean "amicable"; the treaty would
allow all measures of redress that fall short of war, including retorsion, reprisal, embargo,
etc.).
112. In this connection, note especially article 12 of Part I of the Treaty of Versailles,
which requires that any serious international dispute be submitted either to arbitration or to
the Council of the League of Nations, and that parties not resort to war until three months
after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council. League of Nations Covenant,
supra note 36, art. 12; see also SHOTWELL, supra note 7, at 255 (identifying four formal
institutional alternative mechanisms for resolving international disputes); Current, supra
note 93, at 216-18.
113. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, at preamble para 3, art. I.
114. Id. at preamble para 4.
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launched against states that had not yet, for whatever reason, signed and
ratified the document.' 
1 5
6. Kellogg-Briand is Permanent.
Unlike many treaties, Kellogg-Briand has no fixed duration; it has
avoided sunset (and even any amendment) to the present day.116
Moreover, the document has no "withdrawal" clause, of the sort that has
become commonplace in more recent arms control treaties. 1 7  The
Charter of the United Nations has, for most practical purposes, come to
supersede Kellogg-Briand," i  and the 1928 restraints would be
suspended (or inapplicable) if a party were attacked by another state, so
there is a type of "escape hatch," but it has never been formally or
overtly exercised.
7. Kellogg-Briand is Not About Criminal Law.
Despite invoking the rhetoric of "outlawry," the treaty is not
concerned with imposing criminal sanctions on countries or individuals.
Today, the crime of aggression might be prosecuted in an international
tribunal, such as a successor to forums established at Nuremburg and
Tokyo, or more recent variations," 9 or perhaps, in the future, the
International Criminal Court. 120  Likewise, pursuant to "universality"
115. See Harriman, supra note 22 at 247 (concluding that under Kellogg-Briand, an
aggressive war of conquest against a non-party is permitted).
116. See MILLER, supra note 25, at 146 (highlighting as "perhaps the most striking
feature" of Kellogg-Briand the fact that the treaty is permanent; saying that "the significance
of such perpetuity is almost impossible of overstatement.").
117. See, e.g., START I, supra note 8, art. XVII.3; CWC, supra note 8, art. XVI.2;
CTBT, supra note 8, art. IX.2 (each establishing a party's right to withdraw from the treaty
if it determines that extraordinary events related to the subject of the treaty have jeopardized
its supreme national interests).
118. Under the Charter, a country may use military force in self-defense or pursuant to
authorization from the Security Council. U.N. Charter, supra note 2, arts. 2.4, 42, 51. In
the event of a conflict between the Charter and any other treaty, the obligations of the
Charter prevail. Id. art. 103. See also Robert J. Delahunty, Paper Charter: Self-Defense and
the Failure of the United Nations Collective Security System, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 871, 888-
89 (2007).
119. See DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (Princeton Univ. Press 2012) (discussing various international and
mixed war crimes tribunals); UW Tribunals Crucial for Delivering Justice for Rwanda,
Former Yugoslavia, Security Council Told, UN NEWS CENTRE (June 5, 2014), available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47968#.U5DMGoU13bk (last visited Dec.
18, 2014) (assessing the impact of ad hoc war crimes tribunals established by the U.N.
Security Council for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia).
120. The International Criminal Court, established pursuant to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court exists to prosecute individuals for "the most serious crimes of
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jurisdiction, perhaps any state could prosecute an individual guilty of
the most serious crimes against the peace.121 But those eventualities
were not in prospect in 1928.122
8. Fundamentally, Kellogg-Briand Represents a Psychological Shift.
That is, the radical spirit behind the treaty is to effect a change (or
to reflect a change that was already occurring in the 1920s) in the way
people (military and civilian leaders, kings and elected officials, and
their general populations) thought about war. The objective was to de-
emphasize war as a normal mode of operation of the international
community; to no longer understand war as something that "just
happens"; to characterize war as extraordinary and aberrational, and as a
phenomenon that requires a justification, including a basis in
international law. The proponents wanted to see war, and preparations
for war, differently - it would not be something that countries would
possess an untrammeled right incessantly to prepare for, threaten, and
conduct; instead, it would be something perpetually to be avoided, to be
circumnavigated via alternative, better processes.
The entire field of modern jus ad bellum, regulating the
circumstances under which a state may now lawfully initiate
international hostilities, thus owes its genesis (or at least its renaissance
from an earlier "just war" tradition) to this paradigm shift. Of course,
the treaty was far from perfect, and alterations in international law
cannot by themselves fully extirpate war from the human experience -
any more than a massive, armed combat can truly "end all wars" - but
new patterns of thought can make an important difference.' 
23
concern to the international community as a whole" including genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and aggression. UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 37
I.L.M. 1002 (1998) (entered into force July 1, 2002). However, the court's jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression has not yet been activated. Report of the Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression, RC/I1, I1-E-011110 45, Annex III, Dec. 22, 2010, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC20 10/RC- I I-Annex.III-ENG.pdf (last visited
Dec. 18, 2014).
121. See AM. LAW INST., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN REL. LAW OF THE U.S.
§ 404 (1987) (discussing the small category of offenses "recognized by the community of
nations as of universal concern," enabling any state to assert jurisdiction; the crime of
aggression is not listed, but might be considered of equivalent status).
122. See WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 20, 107 (discussing the possibility of criminal
prosecution of states or individuals for violations of Kellogg-Briand); see also sources cited
supra note 94 (noting the role that Kellogg-Briand played in underpinning the post-World
War 11 criminal trials of Nazi and Japanese aggressors).
123. See WEHBERG, supra note 14, at 82 (emphasizing the "moral value" of the treaty);
Josephson, supra note 49, at 384 (U.S. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson believed that if
global public opinion desired to make Kellogg-Briand effective, it could become
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III. NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PROLIFERATION, AND WAR
The devastating power of nuclear weapons, the precarious dangers
of nuclear proliferation, and the catastrophic effects of nuclear war are
now so well-appreciated that little elaboration here is required. 124 In
response to these extraordinary hazards, the world community has
undertaken a series of multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral arms control
initiatives - but no one can pretend that this present conglomeration is
adequate to meet the appalling threats.
12 5
A. The Current Threat.
Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger in the world today;
indeed, the greatest danger humanity has ever confronted. A single
nuclear weapon (the standard model of which is now many times more
powerful than the devices that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
1945) could annihilate a city. Even a relatively "small," limited nuclear
irresistible); Harriman, supra note 22 at 241-42 (prior to Kellogg-Briand, every state had an
absolute ight under international law to make war; that has changed); Harvard Research,
supra note 77, at 857 (noting that in the 1890s, it was not possible to say that state's
decision to go to war could be illegal - it was either permitted by international law or simply
unregulated by it); see Moore, supra note 35, at 9; Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War
and the Law of War, 47 AM. J. INT'L. L. 365, 369 (1953) (arguing that the moral, social, and
psychological change effected by the Kellogg-Briand Pact would require generations, not
merely decades, to succeed); HOWARD, supra note 33, at 9 (discussing St. Augustine's
concept of 'just war"); Christopher M. Petras, The Use of Force in Response to Cyber-
Attack on Commercial Space Systems-Reexamining "Self-Defense " in Outer Space in Light
of the Convergence of U.S. Military and Commercial Space Activities, 67 J. AiR L. & COM.
1213 (2007); Leo Van den hole, Anticipatory Self-Defence Under International Law, 19 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 69 (2003).
124. See Nuclear Weapons Effects Technology, Militarily Critical Technologies List:
See. VI, Nuclear Weapons Effects Technology, FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mctl98-2/p2sec06.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); The Effects
of Nuclear War, U.S. OFFICE TECHN. ASSESSMENT (May 1979), available at
http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/7906/index.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); U.S. DEP'T
DEF. & ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV. ADMIN, THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Samuel
Glasstone & Philip J. Dolan eds., 1977), available at http://www.fourmilab.ch
/etexts/www/effects/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)[hereinafter THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS]; Scientific Aspects of Nuclear Explosion Phenomena, TRINITY ATOMIC WEBSITE,
available at http://www.abombl.org/nukeffct/enw77b3.html#foot_7 (last visited Dec. 18,
2014); Nuclear Detonations: Contemplating Catastrophe: Development and Disarmament
Roundtable, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (2013), available at http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-
detonations-contemplating-catastrophe (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
125. See generally STEVEN PIFER & MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, THE OPPORTUNITY: NEXT
STEPS IN REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMS (2012); OLIVER MEIER & CHRISTOPHER DAASE, ARMS
CONTROL IN THE 2 1sT CENTURY: BETWEEN COERCION AND COOPERATION (2013); WARD
WILSON, FIVE MYTHS ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS (2013); GRAHAM, JR.& LAVERA, supra
note 13.
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war would inflict devastation of historic proportions on a country (or
several). A massive nuclear exchange would jeopardize the planet's
civilization and quite possibly eradicate all human life on earth. For the
United States, nuclear weapons pose an existential threat - they are the
only mechanism that could inflict sudden, massive, inescapable societal
destruction. 1
26
Nine countries are known to possess nuclear weapons: China,
France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Many more states hold the potential to
join that club; they have the intellectual, industrial, and managerial
capability, as well as access to the necessary raw materials.
Proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries (and, afortiori,
to terrorist organizations) could be calamitous, further destabilizing
international political relations and empowering localized disputes to
mushroom to global dimensions.
127
126. See Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, U.S. DEP'T DEF. (June
2014), available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/DoDStrategyforCountering_
Weapons of MassDestruction datedJune_2014.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); see
Nuclear Posture Review Report, U.S. DEP'T DEF. 3 (April 2010), available at
http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear /20Posture%20Review / 20Report.pdf
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report] (discussing
threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism); PAUL BRACKEN, THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE:
STRATEGY, DANGER AND THE NEW POWER POLITICS (Henry Holt & Co. LLC 2012);
MICHELLE BENTLEY, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND US FOREIGN POLICY: THE
STRATEGIC USE OF A CONCEPT (2014); MARK A. HARWELL, NUCLEAR WINTER: THE HUMAN
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR (1984); Alan Robock & Owen
Brian Toon, Self-Assured Destruction: The Climate Impacts of Nuclear War, 68 BULL.
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 66 (2012); Michael J. Mills et al., Multidecadal Global Cooling and
Unprecedented Ozone Loss Following a Regional Nuclear Conflict, AGU PUBLICATIONS
(Apr. 1, 2014), available at http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/MillsNWeft224.pdf (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014).
127. See Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra note 126; see
Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASs'N (last updated June
23, 2014), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswho
haswhat (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (estimating the nuclear weapons stockpiles of nine
countries: China 240; France fewer than 300; Russia 1512 deployed strategic warheads, plus
3000 others; United Kingdom 225; United States 4804; India up to 100; Israel 75-200;
Pakistan 90-110; North Korea 4-8); Status of World Nuclear Forces, FED'N AMER.
SCIENTISTS (last updated Apr. 30, 2014), available at http://fas.org/issues/
nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (providing
slightly different numerical estimates); Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, US Nuclear
Forces, 2014, 70 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 85 (2014); Press Release, Stockholm Int'l
Peace Research Inst., Nuclear Forces Reduced Whole Modernizations Continue, Says
SIPRI, SIPRI (June 16, 2014), available at http://www.sipri.org/media/
pressreleases/2014/nuclear May_2014 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community: Hearing before the S. Armed Services
Comm., 1 13th Cong. (2014) (statement of John R. Clapper, Dir. of National Intelligence),
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Blocking the further spread of nuclear weapons has always been a
top global priority, but it is a strenuous challenge. Nuclear weapons
technology is now decades old; the very nature of technology is to
propagate, and the basic secrets of bomb-building are now well-
dispersed. The "trick" to avoiding further proliferation, therefore, must
lie in politics, not in denial or force. As Jonathan Schell observed:
The world's safety ultimately depends not on the number of
nations that want to build nuclear weapons but cannot, but on the
number that can but do not. If the spread of nuclear weapons is to be
prevented over the long run, it cannot come through restrictions on
nations' capacity. Instead, it must come by influencing their will.' 28
Unfortunately, the world at the moment seems a bit "stuck" in its
efforts to influence the most relevant nations' respective willingness to
reduce the dangers of nuclear possession and proliferation. The global
stockpile of nuclear weapons has, blessedly, been greatly reduced: by
the leading estimate, the world has produced some 125,000 nuclear
weapons (ninety-seven percent manufactured by the United States and
the Soviet Union/Russia) since 1945; today, approximately 10,000
remain in active military stockpiles, with thousands more awaiting
dismantlement. 129 But the reductions process seems to have fallen into
hiatus: there are no major nuclear arms control negotiations under way
or in prospect, and several participants are currently ramping up and
modernizing, rather than winnowing, their strategic forces.' 30
available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2014%20WWTA%20SFRSASC 11
Feb.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (providing the U.S. intelligence community's judgment
that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a major threat to the security of
the United States and its allies); Edward A. Friedman & Roger K. Lewis, A Scenario for
Jihadist Nuclear Revenge, FED'N AMER. SCIENTISTS (2014), available at http://fas.org/pir-
pubs/scenario-jihadist-nuclear-revenge/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Matthew Bunn et al.,
The U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment of Nuclear Terrorism, BELFER CENTER FOR SCI. &
INT'L AFF. (2011), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Joint-Threat-
Assessment%20ENG%2027%20May/o20201 I.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). But see
Kenneth N. Waltz, Why Iran Should Get the Bomb Nuclear: Balancing Would Mean
Stability, 19 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (2012) (arguing that proliferation is inevitable and can be
stabilizing).
128. Jonathan Schell, The Folly of Arms Control, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 28 (2000); see
also R. Scott Kemp, The Nonproliferation Emperor has no Clothes: The Gas Centrifuge,
Supply-Side Controls and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation, 38 INT'L SECURITY 39, 39
(Spring 2014) (arguing that export controls and economic sanctions are insufficient to
prevent a country from developing or acquiring the capability to develop nuclear weapons;
political and cultural factors must play the leading roles).
129. Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories,
1945-2013, 69 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 75, 75 (2013), available at http://bos.sage
pub.com/content/69/5/75.full.pdf+html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Inventories].
130. See id. (reporting that Russia is undertaking a major transformation of its nuclear
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The concept of complete nuclear disarmament has only
episodically been on the front burner of international politics., 3' This
iconoclastic notion experienced an abrupt resurgence with the
publication, beginning in January 2007, of a series of vigorous
advocacy columns in the Wall Street Journal penned by four of the
most prominent senior U.S. statesmen, George P. Shultz, William J.
Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. 132  The momentum for
"getting to zero" suddenly intensified, with a torrent of supportive
opinion pieces, analytical conferences, books and articles; diverse
countries and NGOs vigorously took up the cause. 133 President Obama
posture and deploying fewer, but newer, weapons; China is likely to double its force of
intercontinental ballistic missile warheads in the next fifteen years; and India and Pakistan
are in an arms race to deploy new weapons types); see also Kristensen & Norris, supra note
127, at 88-92; Hans M. Kristensen, Nuclear Weapons Modernization: A Threat to the NPT?,
44 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 8 (May 2014), available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014 05/Nuclear-Weapons-Modemization-A-Threat-to-the-
NPT (last visited Jan. 9, 2015); see Ray Acheson, Modernization of Nuclear Weapons:
Aspiring to "Indefinite Retention"?, 68 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 88, 88 (2012); The NPT
Action Plan Monitoring Report, REACHING CRITICAL WILL 31-40 (2014), available at
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Publications/20 10-Action
-Plan/NPTActionPlan 2014.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter REACHING
CRITICAL WILL] (assessing status of world nuclear forces); see generally Assuring
Destruction Forever: Nuclear Weapon Modernization Around the World, REACHING
CRITICAL WILL (Ray Acheson ed., 2012), available at http://www.reaching
criticalwill.org/images/documents/Publications/modemization/assuring-destruction
-forever.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Assuring Destruction].
131. At their summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland October 11-12, 1986, President
Ronald Reagan and Soviet Union General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev came astonishingly
close to an agreement to abolish all their nuclear weapons; at the last minute, such a
breathtaking accord dissolved, and was not subsequently pursued. See generally REYKJAVIK
REVISITED: STEPS TOWARD A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (George P. Shultz et al.
eds., 2008); see generally IMPLICATIONS OF THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT ON ITS TWENTIETH
ANNIVERSARY (Sidney D. Drell & George P. Shultz eds., 2007); see Thomas Blanton &
Svetlana Savranskaya, Reykjavik: When Abolition Was Within Reach, 41 ARMS CONTROL
TODAY 46 (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/20l1_10/
ReykjavikWhenAbolitionWasWithinReach (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
132. George P. Shultz et al., A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4,
2007, at Al5 (proposing "setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working
energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal"). Additional op-ed pieces by this
group followed in 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2013. See PHILIP TAUBMAN, THE PARTNERSHIP:
FIVE COLD WARRIORS AND THEIR QUEST TO BAN THE BOMB (2012).
133. See GETTING TO ZERO: THE PATH TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (Catherine
McArdle Kelleher & Judith Reppy eds., 2011); RUSSIA AND THE DILEMMAS OF NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Alexei Arbatov et al. eds., 2012); ELEMENTS
OF A NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT TREATY (Barry M. Blechman & Alexander K. Bollfrass eds.,
2010); CULTIVATING CONFIDENCE: VERIFICATION, MONITORING, AND ENFORCEMENT FOR A
WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Corey Hinderstein ed., 2010); STEVEN PIFER AND
MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, THE OPPORTUNITY: NEXT STEPS IN REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMS
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famously endorsed the concept of nuclear abolition in his celebrated
Prague speech on April 5, 2009,'14 and the Security Council of the
United Nations did likewise in resolution 1887 on September 24,
2009.' But the bubble of enthusiasm for disarmament seems to have
deflated in the past couple of years, as fickle international politics
zigzagged toward other topics. 136
(2012); NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROGRESS (P.M. Kamath ed.,
2013); Ivo Daalder & Jan Lodal, The Logic of Zero: Toward a World Without Nuclear
Weapons, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 80 (2008); Christopher Ford, A New Paradigm: Shattering
Obsolete Thinking on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 38 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 12
(Nov. 2008), available at http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2008_1 1/ford (last visited Jan. 9,
2015); ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A DEBATE (George Perkovich & James Acton,
eds., 2009) [hereinafter Perkovich & Acton]; Michael Krepon, Ban the Bomb. Really., 3
AMERICAN INTEREST, at 88 (Winter 2008); NUCLEAR ABOLITION FORUM, MOVING BEYOND
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE TO A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE WORLD (Rob van Riet ed., 2013);
JAMES M. ACTON, Low NUMBERS: A PRACTICAL PATH TO DEEP NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS
(2011), available at http://camegieendowment.org/files/lownumbers.pdf (last visited Dec.
18, 2014); TAUBMAN, supra note 132, at 338-40 (discussing non-governmental groups
focused on nuclear disarmament, the Nuclear Threat Institute (headed by Sam Nunn) and
Global Zero (headed by Bruce Blair, Matt Brown and Barry Blechman)); G.A. Res. 67/56,
U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/56 (Dec. 3, 2012) (creating an "open-ended
working group" to develop proposals for the achievement of a world without nuclear
weapons); MIDDLE POWERS INITIATIVE, available at http://www.middlepowers.org/
about.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (collection of NGOs working with "middle" states to
promote nuclear disarmament).
134. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by President Barack
Obama at Hradcany Square in the Czech Republic (Apr. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-
Prague-As-Delivered/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (stating "America's commitment to seek
the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons"); see also SIDNEY D. DRELL &
JAMES E. GOODBY, A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS: END-STATE ISSUES 1-2 (2009)
(quoting 2009 joint statement by President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
pledging both countries to pursue a nuclear weapons-free world).
135. S.C. Res 1887, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1887 (Sept. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1887%282009%29 (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014).
136. See William J. Perry, Commentary, My Personal Journey at the Nuclear Brink,
EUR. LEADERSHIP NETWORK (June 17, 2013), available at http://www.europeanleadership
network.org/my-personal-journey-at-the-nuclear-brink-by-bill-perry_633.html (last visited
Dec. 18, 2014) (commenting that "in 2011 that progress and forward momentum [toward
dealing with the nuclear legacy of the cold war] began to stall out and even reverse.");
George P. Shultz et al., Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Risks: The Pace of Nonproliferation
Work Today Doesn't Match the Urgency of the Threat, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2013)
(observing that "[t]he continuing risk posed by nuclear weapons remains an overarching
strategic problem, but the pace of work doesn't match the urgency of the threat."); Ward
Wilson, The Myth of Nuclear Necessity, in NUCLEAR ABOLITION FORUM, MOVING BEYOND
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE TO A NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE WORLD 1 (2013) (noting that "the
abolition movement seems stalled."); GEORGE PERKOVICH, Do UNTO OTHERS: TOWARD A
DEFENSIBLE NUCLEAR DOCTRINE 2 (2013), available at
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The International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), the successor under the
U.N. Charter to the PCIJ as the leading global judicial institution for the
resolution of international legal disputes, 37 has addressed nuclear
weapons in depth once,1 38 and is now poised to do so again. In 1994,
the General Assembly requested an "advisory opinion" from the court
on the question, "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any
circumstance permitted under international law?" Participating states'
disparate briefings and arguments on the matter, and the various ICJ
judges' voluminous separate opinions, reveal a stark array of
contradictory perspectives on point, but several key principles stand
out. 39 The ICJ determined that: a) traditional standards of the law of
armed conflict apply fully to nuclear weapons, as to all others; 40 b) a
threat to conduct an illegal use of force is itself illegal under the U.N.
Charter, even before it is carried out; 14 1 c) because nuclear weapons
carry such widespread, severe and long-lasting effects, their use is
"scarcely reconcilable" with the legal requirements of proportionality
and avoidance of civilian casualties; 142 and d) nevertheless, the court
was unable to conclude definitively that all possible uses of nuclear
weapons would be categorically illegitimate - perhaps a detonation
against an isolated military target far removed from civilian areas, or in
circumstances where a nation's very survival depended upon the
application of such overwhelming force could be legally tolerable. 143
In 2014, nuclear weapons re-appeared on the ICJ docket. The
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/do-unto-others.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)
(asserting that "progress stopped" on nuclear disarmament in 2012).
137. U.N. Charter, supra note 2, art. 92; Statute of the International Court of Justice,
art. 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179.
138. See also Nuclear Tests, (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 457, 458 (Dec. 20)
(concerning the legality of atmospheric nuclear tests conducted by France in the South
Pacific); see also Nuclear Tests, (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 97 (Dec. 20).
139. See Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226-28 (July 8) [hereinafter ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons]; see also
Dean Granoff & Jonathan Granoff, International Humanitarian Law and Nuclear Weapons:
Irreconcilable Differences, 67 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 53, 53-62 (2011); Charles J.
Moxley, Jr., John Burroughs & Jonathan Granoff, Nuclear Weapons and Compliance with
International Humanitarian Law and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 34 FORDHAM
INT'L L. J. 595 (2011); Ken Berry et al., Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons, MONTEREY INST.
INT'L STUDIES 1, 30-33 (2010).
140. ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra note 139, para. 105(2)(C)-(D)
(unanimously concluding that the provisions of the U.N. Charter and of international
humanitarian law apply to the threat or use of nuclear weapons).
141. Id. para47.
142. Id. para 95.
143. Id. para 105(2)(E) (by seven votes to seven, with the president of the court casting
the deciding vote).
[Vol. 42:1
2014] A Nuclear Kellogg-Briand Pact
Republic of the Marshall Islands filed nine cases, one against each of
the nuclear-weapons-possessing countries, alleging that they had failed
in their obligations, pursuant to treaty and customary international law,
to pursue nuclear disarmament. 144 Six of these cases, brought against
countries that have not accepted the "compulsory jurisdiction" of the
ICJ, have not been entered onto the court's registry, and seem destined
to go nowhere, 145 but the suits against India, Pakistan, and the United
Kingdom may provide additional grist for nuclear arms control judicial
machinery for years to come. 1
46
Underpinning all these debates is a continuing dialectic about the
"usability" of nuclear weapons. For some, a nuclear weapon is,
basically, just a weapon like any other - it can be prudently deployed,
brandished, and used against military targets to achieve desired
warfighting goals.1 47  Although nuclear weapons are immensely
powerful, and they unleash a variety of novel and persistent types of
effects, a clever design team could construct a very small, precisely-
144. Press Release No. 2014/18, International Court of Justice, The Republic of the
Marshall Islands files Applications against nine States for their alleged failure to fulfill their
obligations with respect to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, April 25, 2014, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/presscom/files/0/ I 8300.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
145. To be amenable to suit under the "contentious case" docket of the International
Court of Justice, a state must "accept" the jurisdiction of the court. Three of the relevant
countries have done so in the broadest fashion, pursuant to Article 36 (2) of the Statute of
the Court, supra note 47. See generally Basis of the Court's Jurisdiction, INT'L CT. JUST.,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl=5&p2=l&p3=2 (last visited
Dec. 18, 2014).
146. See Cases, INT'L CT. JUST., available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
index.php?pl =3&p2=3 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (listing contentious cases on the court's
docket). Of these three countries, only the United Kingdom is a party to the 1968 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, so the claims against India and Pakistan are grounded in
customary international law.
147. See Al Pressin, Rumsfeld Endorses Research on Earth Penetrating Weapon,
VOICE AM. (April 27, 2005), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/
news/usa/2005/usa-050427-327d6blfhtm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (quoting then-
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as advocating development of small, precise nuclear
weapons for attacking an enemy's hard and deeply buried targets, saying "The only thing
we have is very large, very dirty, big nuclear weapons. So the choice is, do we want to have
nothing and only a large dirty nuclear weapon, or would we rather have something in
between. That is the issue."); Ann Scott Tyson, Nuclear Plan Changes Calculus of
Deterrence, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Mar. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0314/pOls03-usmi.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)
(quoting defense expert Loren Thompson saying "Most of the nuclear options at our
disposal now are so gross that their use is not credible ... To deter, we must have options
that the enemy believes we will use."); Thomas Dowler & Joseph Howard It, Countering
the Threat of the Well-Armed Tyrant: A Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear Weapons, 19
STRATEGIC REV. 34 (1991).
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targeted nuclear weapon, which would occupy a range not very different
from that of the largest conventional weapons, and the radiation and
other unique effects could be tailored to particular types of combat
missions. 48  For these advocates, it is a mistake to consider nuclear
weapons to be categorically different from other ordnance; muddled
thinking about a single, inviolable "nuclear threshold" simply impedes
rational strategizing about deterrence in all its manifestations.149
Others, however, conclude that nuclear weapons are, indeed,
"different," and people should continue to think of them as lying outside
the realm of usability. In this view, nuclear weapons are irrelevant for
any task other than deterring another actor's potential use of nuclear
weapons.15 0  For all other applications, they are simply too big
148. See Nuclear Posture Review Report, U.S. DEP'T DEF., (2002), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/class/polisci2lIz12.6/NPR2001 leaked.pdf (last visited Dec. 18,
2014) (calling for greater flexibility in U.S. nuclear forces, seeking "Nuclear attack options
that vary in scale, scope, and purpose."); Keith B. Payne, The Nuclear Jitters, 55.12 NAT'L
REV. 22 (2003); Charles D. Ferguson, Mini-Nuclear Weapons and the U.S. Nuclear Posture
Review, JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES (Jan. 8, 2002), available at
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/020408.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (reporting controversy
regarding concept of nuclear "bunker buster"); Task Force Report: Resilient Military
Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat, DEPT. DEF.: DEF. Sci. BOARD 8 (2013), available
at http://cryptome.org/2013/07/cyber-war-racket-0014.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)
(suggesting that a first use of nuclear weapons might be a suitable response to a cyber-
attack); Julian Coman, Pentagon Wants "Mini-Nukes" to Fight Terrorists, TELEGRAPH (Oct.
26, 2003, 12:01 AM), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/northamerica/usa/1445165/Pentagon-wants-mini-nukes-to-fight-terrorists.htm
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
149. See Michael S. Gerson, No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy, 35
INT'L SEC. 7, 12-13 (2010); see McGeorge Bundy, George G. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara
& Gerard C. Smith, Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 753
(1982) [hereinafter Bundy et al.]; Barry Watts, Nuclear-Conventional Firebreaks and the
Nuclear Taboo, CTR. STRATEGIC & BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 5-28 (2013), available at
http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2013/04/nuclear-conventional-firebreaks-and-the-
nuclear-taboo/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Colin Powell, Nuclear Weapons Are Useless,
THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 27, 2010, 5:30 PM), available at http://thinkprogress.org/
security/2010/01/27/175869/colin-powell-nuclear-weapons-are-useless/(last visited Dec. 18,
2014) (quoting former Secretary of State Colin Powell as concluding that nuclear weapons
were "useless."); HERMAN KAHN, ON ESCALATION: METAPHORS AND SCENARIOS (2009)
(regarding the concept of limited, winnable nuclear war and the possible multi-rung nuclear
escalation ladder).
150. See PERKOVICH, supra note 136, at 45-52, 73-74; Bundy et al., supra note 149, at
757 (arguing that "no one has ever succeeded in advancing any persuasive reason to believe
that any use of nuclear weapons, even on the smallest scale, could reliably be expected to
remain limited."); Daalder & Lodal, supra note 133, at 80, 81 (arguing that the sole purpose
of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter use by others; other functions "are no longer realistic or
necessary for the United States."); Watts, supra note 149, at 1-2 (presenting as conventional
wisdom the perception that nuclear weapons are "special" and qualitatively different from
other weapons); Berry et al., supra note 139, at 47-49 (reporting views of U.S. and other
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militarily; their effects are legally too indiscriminate, disproportional
and long-lasting; and politically, the stigmatization from crossing this
brightest of "red lines" would be intolerable. 1
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B. Efforts to Reduce the Threat of Nuclear Weapons.
As noted above, the world has already undertaken numerous
valuable, albeit limited, steps to abate the threat of nuclear
Armageddon. 5 2  The most important multilateral instrument is
undoubtedly the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT").
153
Under it, the "non-nuclear-weapon states" ("NNWS") (i.e., almost all of
the treaty's 189 parties) agree never to manufacture or acquire nuclear
weapons; they promise additionally to submit to rigorous international
inspection to verify their continued non-possession.' 54  In return, the
five "nuclear-weapon states" ("NWS") (i.e., China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom and the United States) agree, among other
commitments,' 55 to rein in their own nuclear armadas. In particular, in
Article VI, "[e]ach of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and
on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control."'
156
military leaders regarding utility of nuclear weapons).
151. See Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, Address Before a
Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 25, 1984), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=40205 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)
(asserting that "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in
our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But
then would it not be better to do away with them entirely."); Sidney D. Drell & James E.
Goodby, What Are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations for Restructuring U.S.
Strategic Nuclear Forces, ARMS CONTROL ASS'N REPORT (Oct. 2007).
152. See supra notes 8, 78-85 and accompanying text; see also Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY Doc No. 111-5
(2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf (last visited
Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter New START Treaty].
153. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 168 [hereinafter NPT].
154. Id. arts. II, 111.
155. The treaty also specifies the inalienable right of all parties to use nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes, and commits all parties to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and information for those purposes. Id. art. IV.
156. Id. art. VI. Note that four states, each of which possesses nuclear weapons, are
not parties to the NPT: India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. See David S. Jonas,
Variations on Non-Nuclear: May the "Final Four" Join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapon States While Retaining Their Nuclear Weapons?, 2005
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The profound global controversy eating at the heart of the non-
proliferation enterprise - a challenge that has strained the NPT regime
for decades - concerns the extent of NWS compliance with their Article
VI obligations. Several NNWS have vigorously complained that the
NWS have consistently failed to "pursue negotiations in good faith" on
the most critical of the anticipated "effective measures" toward nuclear
arms control and disarmament. NNWS cite the fact that more than forty
years after the conclusion of the NPT, nuclear weapons still exist in the
thousands; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not in force; other
associated instruments are not even under negotiation; and the nine
nuclear powers seem no closer to a complete and permanent
abandonment of their privileged position. 5 7
Several of the "review conferences" for the NPT, held at five-year
intervals, have been roiled by vigorous disputes over the NWS fidelity
to Article VI; some of them have virtually broken down in discord. 158
In 1995, when the original twenty-five year duration of the NPT was
MICH. ST. L. REV. 417 (2005); DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 56-76 (2009) (discussing article VI and
the NPT regime).
157. NPT Review Conference, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), para. 80-86
(June 2010) (noting concern about large number of nuclear weapons deployed and
stockpiled, and calling for further progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in
security policies); NPT Review Conference, Apr. 24 - May 19, 2000, U.N. Doc.
NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Vol. I), para. 2 (2000) (expressing deep concern about nuclear
weapons policies and accomplishments) [hereinafter NPT 2000 Review Conference Final
Document]; Acheson, supra note 130, at 92; Kristensen, supra note 130; George Bunn &
Roland M. Timerbaev, Nuclear Disarmament: How Much have the Five Nuclear Powers
Promised in the Non-Proliferation Treaty?, in JOHN RHINELANDER & ADAM SCHEINMAN, AT
THE NUCLEAR CROSSROADS 11 (1995); Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, Slowing
Nuclear Weapon Reductions and Endless Nuclear Weapon Modernizations: A Challenge to
the NPT, 70 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 94 (2014).
158. See Alexander Kmentt, How Divergent Views on Nuclear Disarmament Threaten
the NPT, 43 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 8 (Dec. 2013), available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_ 12/How-Divergent-Views-on-Nuclear-Disarmament-
Threaten-the-NPT (last visited Jan. 9, 2015); George Bunn & Jean du Preez, More Than
Words: The Value of U.S. Non-Nuclear-Use Promises, 37 ARMS CONTROL TODAY
(July/Aug. 2007), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/21935/Bunn More
-ThanWords The Value of U.S._Non-Nuclear-UsePromises.pdf (last visited Jan. 9,
2015) (reporting that "An acrimonious debate about security assurances was among the
reasons for the failed 2005 NPT review conference."); Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Rough
Seas Ahead: Issues for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, 44 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 20
(Apr. 2014), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_04/Rough-Seas-
Ahead Issues-for-the-2015-NPT-Review-Conference (last visited Jan. 9, 2015); Tom Z.
Collina, Lance Garrison, & Daniel Homer, Stage Set for 2015 NPT Review Conference, 44
ARMS CONTROL TODAY 25 (Apr. 2014), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2014 06/News/Stage-Set-for-2015-NPT-Review-Conference (last visited Jan. 9, 2015);
John Burroughs, International Law, in Assuring Destruction, supra note 130, at 115.
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extended indefinitely,' 59 the NNWS insisted upon faster progress and
greater accountability. 160  In subsequent sessions, a series of thirteen
"practical steps" and a roster of sixty-four "action items" were
negotiated, in the so-far-futile effort to specify time-bound
implementation of the NWS progress on point.' 61
C. No First Use Statements and Security Assurances.
The principal vehicles through which the NWS move toward
fulfillment of their Article VI obligations are the series of agreements
and unilateral actions that directly limit and reduce their respective
nuclear firepower. As noted above, substantial success has been
registered in capping these inventories, although the process is so far
from complete that the NNWS are, reasonably, unsated.
An important subsidiary or associated set of measures in pursuit of
the "basic bargain" of the NPT therefore consists of a series of
additional promises or declarations that the NWS make regarding their
plans and commitments about the future possible use and threat of
nuclear weapons. These prominently include "no first use" ("NFU")
pledges and related "security assurances." An NFU declaration is
simply a statement that the country will not be the first to initiate a use
of nuclear weapons; it could be formed as a revocable statement of
intention, a political commitment or a legally binding undertaking.
NFU attestations could be phrased in varying ways; typically they
would (explicitly or implicitly) reserve the right to use nuclear weapons
"second," if necessary to respond to an enemy's prior exercise of
159. The NPT had an initial duration of twenty-five years, so in 1995, the parties
convened a conference to determine its fate. NPT, supra note 153, art. X.2. The conference
decided to extend the treaty "indefinitely," and in the process, generated a series of
commitments and understandings, including those related to article VI and nuclear arms
control. See THOMAS GRAHAM, JR., DISARMAMENT SKETCHES: THREE DECADES OF ARMS
CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 257-93 (2002).
160. 1995 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 23-25, U.N. Sales No. E.96. X.l (decision of 1995
Conference on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,
including provisions on nuclear weapon free zones and security assurances) [hereinafter
1995 RevCon decision].
161. NPT 2000 Review Conference Final Document, supra note 157, para. 15
(recording conference's agreement on thirteen "practical steps for the systematic and
progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty."); see REACHING CRITICAL WILL,
supra note 130, at 6 (summarizing steps taken in pursuit of 64-point Action Plan agreed at
the 2010 NPT Review Conference and assessing NWS performance as disappointing on
nuclear disarmament); see Mukhatzhanova, supra note 158, at 21 (noting that the rate of
implementation of the disarmament actions has been so disappointing that some NWS "are
bound to ask whether the action plan only creates the appearance of progress and whether a
new approach is needed.").
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nuclear weapons against the state (or its allies); other caveats might be
added, too.
162
Related are two types of security assurances. A "negative"
security assurance ("NSA") is a promise that the offeror will refrain
from using nuclear weapons against a particular state (or collection of
states), typically subject to provisos such as the condition that the
offeree refrain from pursuing or possessing nuclear weapons itself and
that it not engage in warfare against the offeror in alliance with another
NWS. 163 A "positive" security assurance ("PSA") is an avowal to come
to the aid of a state that is victimized by another state's use of nuclear
weapons; again, it could be subject to a variety of non-proliferation or
other conditions. 1
64
All of these NFU, NSA and PSA declarations could be issued in
the context of the NPT, as part of another treaty, or independently.
They could be extended to all states or they could privilege NPT
members (in order to provide an additional incentive for outliers to join
that treaty). 165
162. Harold A. Feiveson & Ernst Jan Hogendoom, No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,
10 NONPROLIFERATION REV. 90 (summer 2003); see Scott Sagan, The Case for No First
Use, 51 SURVIVAL 163 (2009); see generally London Conference on No First Use of
Nuclear Weapons, PUGWASH CONFERENCES ON SCIENCE & W. AFFS. (November 18, 2002),
available at http://pugwash.org/?s-no+first+use (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (collection of
scientific and political papers on NFU).
163. See JEFFREY W. KNOPF, SECURITY ASSURANCES AND NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION (2012); Feiveson & Hogendoorn, supra note 162; Bunn & du Preez,
supra note 158; JAMES D. FRY, LEGAL RESOLUTION OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
DISPUTES 88-96 (2013).
164. S.C. Res. 984, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 984 (Apr. 11, 1995), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/984 (1995) (last visited Dec.
18, 2014) (expressing intention to assist states victimized by aggression with nuclear
weapons or the threat of nuclear weapons); S.C. Res. 255, U.N. Doc. S/RES/255 (June 19,
1968), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=SIRES
/255(1968) (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
165. 1995 RevCon decision, supra note 160, at 54-55; MOHAMED SHAKER, THE
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION 1959-1979, at 471-
552 (Oceana, vol. 11 1980); Richard H. Ullman, No First Use of Nuclear Weapons, 50
FOREIGN AFF. 669, 679-80, (1972); George Bunn & Roland M. Timerbaev, Security
Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States, NONPROLIFERATION REV. 11, 16-17 (1993)
(suggesting a U.N. Security Council resolution as a mechanism for promulgating security
assurances); see also Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's
Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc. A/49/765
(Dec. 19, 1994), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/viewdoc.asp?symbol=A/49/
765 (last visited Dec. 19, 2014) (NSA and PSA extended by United States, Russia, and
United Kingdom to Ukraine, when Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons and joined the NPT);
G.A. Res. 68/58, U.N. Doc. AIRES/68/58 (Dec. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=AIRES/68/58 (last visited Dec. 18,
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The strategy behind NFU, NSA and PSA undertakings is the
calculation that NNWS are more likely to be content in their perpetual
"second class citizenship" if they are reassured that their own national
security will not unduly suffer thereby. If they are protected against the
NWS threat or use of nuclear weapons, then eschewing the opportunity
to acquire weapons on their own should be a more tolerable path.
NNWS have therefore sought these commitments as a part of the NPT
quid pro quo, and a frequent point of contention, at NPT review
conferences and elsewhere, has been the precision, comprehensiveness
and reliability of those NWS oaths. 16
6
Outside the NPT context, the NWS have a checkered history with
these commitments. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union issued a
broad NFU pledge in June 1982, and challenged the United States to
reciprocate. In contrast, because NATO feared that its conventional
forces might then be insufficient to stem an envisioned Warsaw Pact
invasion of Western Europe, the United States insisted that it might,
2014) (requesting the commencement of negotiations on a treaty to prohibit the threat or use
of nuclear weapons under any circumstances).
166. See John Simpson, The Role of Security Assurances in the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Regime, in KNOPF, supra note 163 (surveying effectiveness of NSAs as a
non-proliferation tool); Feiveson & Hogendoorn, supra note 162, at 91, 95-96 (noting that at
the 1995 and 2000 NPT review conferences, NNWS strongly argued in favor of the NWS
providing rigorous, legally binding NSAs and PSAs); New Zealand et al., Security
Assurances (James Martin Ctr. for Nonproliferation Studies and King's Coll. Ctr. for Sci.
and Sec. Studies, Working Paper J-4, 2003), in Prepatory Committee for the 2005 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
NPT/CoNF.2005.PC.II/WP. 11 (May 1, 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/viewdoc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP. 11 (last
visited Dec.18, 2014) [hereinafter CSSS Briefing Book]; REACHING CRITICAL WILL, supra
note 130, at 12, 52-54 (assessing NWS progress on 2010 commitments regarding security
assurances); 1995 RevCon decision, supra note 160, at 25, 50-64; Gerson, supra note 149,
at 42; Bunn & Timerbaev, supra note 157, at 11, 13; Thomas Graham & Leonor Tomero,
"Obligations for Us All": NATO & Negative Security Assurances, 49 DISARMAMENT DIPL.
(2000), available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/49nato.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)
(tracing the evolution of NSAs in the NPT context); Leonard S. Spector & Aubrie Ohlde,
Negative Security Assurances: Revisiting the Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zone Option, 35 ARMS
CONTROL TODAY 13 (Apr. 2005), available at
http://www.arrnscontrol.org/act/2005 04/Spector Ohlde (last visited Jan. 9, 2015); A New
Look at No First Use, STANLEY FOUND. 4 (Apr. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pdb/NoFirstUsePDB708.pdf (last visited
Dec. 18, 2014); see also David S. Jonas, General and Complete Disarmament: Not Just for
Nuclear Weapons States Anymore, 43 GEO. J. INT'L L. 587 (2012) (arguing that NPT article
VI imposes obligations on all parties, not only the NWS, to pursue complete disarmament);
G.A. Res. 68/28, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/28 (Dec. 9, 2013), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/28 (last visited Dec. 18,
2014) (reaffirming the urgent need for effective NSAs); Philipp C. Bleek & Eric B. Lorber,
Security Guarantees andAllied Nuclear Proliferation, 58 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 429 (2013).
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indeed, be the first to use nuclear weapons, if that were the only
remaining bulwark against aggression. After the dissolution of the
U.S.S.R., however, it was Russia, with its greatly diminished military
prowess that felt the need for "strategic ambiguity" in its nuclear
posture, and in 1993 it rescinded the no first use declaration.1 67
The U.S. NFU posture has likewise evolved. In the 1950s, the
official policy explicitly endorsed the possibility of a first use, but by
the 1970s, the turn of phrase favored an emphasis on restraint, subject to
certain exceptions; these statements have been episodically tweaked and
refined by successive administrations.1 68  Under the current iteration,
expressed in the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report (the
Department of Defense's highest-level strategy document), the United
States "will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty ("NPT") and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation
obligations." 169
The most nearly concerted NWS position on NFU and NSAs came
167. See Beatrice Heuser, Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 1970s and 1980s:
Findings in the East German Archives, 12 COMP. STRATEGY 437 (1993); Feiveson &
Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 92; Ullman, supra note 165, at 670-72; Yuri Fedorov,
Russia's Doctrine on the Use of Nuclear Weapons (Pugwash Meeting No. 279, Working
Paper, 2002).
168. See Feiveson & Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 90-91 (highlighting the 2002
statements of the George W. Bush administration, reserving "the right to respond with
overwhelming force - including through resort to all our options" to another state's
aggression, and the 1953 policy of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration that "In the
event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for
use as other munitions."); Bunn & du Preez, supra note 158; Bundy et al., supra note 149;
John Steinbruner, Looking Back: Carter's 1978 Declaration and the Significance of Security
Assurances, 38 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 57 (Oct. 2008), available at
http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2008_10/lookingback (last visited Jan. 9, 2015); Gerson,
supra note 149.
169. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, supra note 126, at 15-16 (The report does
not identify what the reference to "nuclear non-proliferation obligations" might consist of,
other than the NPT. It also stresses that, while U.S. conventional forces would ordinarily be
sufficient to respond to other severe provocations, such as an enemy's use of chemical or
biological weapons, it is difficult to foresee how the catastrophic potential of bio-weapons
might evolve in the future, so "the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment
in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological
weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat." The report also explains that the
United States is not prepared at the present time to adopt a comprehensive NFU policy, "but
will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted."); see
also Securing Britain in an Uncertain Future: The Strategic Defence and Security Review
(Oct. 2010), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment data/file/62482/strategic-defence-security-review.pdf (last visited Dec. 18,
2014); see also Gerson, supra note 149.
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on April 6, 1995, in connection with the extension of the NPT. There,
all five NWS issued national statements; four of these were basically
identical, promising not to use nuclear weapons against NNWS parties
to the NPT, "except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on
[the particular NWS], its territory, its armed forces or other troops, or
against its allies or a State towards which it has a security commitment,
carried out or sustained by such a State in alliance or association with a
nuclear-weapon State."' 170  China alone was considerably more
generous, undertaking "not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any
time or under any circumstances" and "not to use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-
free zones at any time or under any circumstances." '1 71 The contents of
170. Letter from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations
Addressed to the Secretary-General (Apr. 6, 1995), available at
http://globe.blogs.nouvelobs.com/media/01/01/40968903.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
Substantially identical, contemporaneous letters (also including PSA commitments) were
authored by Russia (Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to
the United Nations (Apr. 6, 1995), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/
atf/cf/%/7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%/o7D/Disarm%/20S 1995261 .pdf
(last visited Dec. 1, 2014)); the United Kingdom (Letter from Permanent Representative of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations (Apr. 6,
1995), available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Disarm%20S1995262.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2014))
and the United States (Letter from the Permanent Mission of the United States ofAmerica to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (Apr. 6, 1995), available at
http://globe.blogs.nouvelobs.com/media/01/00/1336803625.2.pdf (last visited Dec. 18,
2014)); 1995 RevCon decision, supra note 160, at 51-64; see also CSSS Briefing Book,
supra note 166, at 1-3 (excerpting prior NSAs from NWS).
171. Letter from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations
Addressed to the Secretary-General (Apr. 6, 1995), available at http://www.pir
center.org/media/content/files/10/13590930390.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). China's
NFU and NSA commitments have traditionally been broad, but outsiders are sometimes
skeptical about the sincerity of the undertakings. See CSSS Briefing Book, supra note 166,
at 1; REACHING CRITICAL WILL, supra note 130, at 31-32; Kelsey Davenport & Marcus
Taylor, Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Updated Report
Card, ARMs CONTROL ASS'N (2010-2013), available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/files/ACA 2013_Nuclear Report Card.pdf (last visited Dec.
18, 2014) [hereinafter Assessing Progress]; see Jeffrey Lewis, China's Nuclear
Idiosyncrasies and Their Challenges 17-18 (IFRI Security Studies Center Proliferation Paper
47, Nov.-Dec. 2013), available at www.ifri.org/downloads/pp47lewis.pdf (last visited Dec.
18, 2014); Ullman, supra note 165, at 669; Annual Report to Congress on Military and
Security Developments involving the People's Republic of China in 2014, U.S. DEP'T DEF.
at 28, available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoDChinaReport.pdf (last visited
Dec. 18, 2014); see Gregory Kulacki, Chickens Talking with Ducks: The U.S.-Chinese
Nuclear Dialogue, 41 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 15 (Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011 10/U.S._ChineseNuclearDialo
gue (last visited Jan. 9, 2015); see Rebecca Heinrichs, China's Strategic Capabilities and
Intent (Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4111, Dec. 18, 2013); see also Bill Gertz, Guess
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the various NFU and NSA postures of the NWS have ebbed and flowed
since then. 
17 2
Similar drama has sometimes attended the NFU postures of other
states, too. India, for example, has long asserted a declaration of no first
use, either in blanket form or subject to limitations. 173 The maintenance
of that tradition was briefly, but excitedly, called into question in April
2014, when the hardline Bharatiya Janata Party ("BJP") was poised to
win the national election and seemed to equivocate about nuclear
policy. Following a flare-up of adverse international reaction, however,
the BJP election manifesto backpedaled, and reaffirmed the country's
accustomed stance. 1
74
In contrast, Pakistan's nuclear doctrine has expressly reserved the
right to use nuclear weapons first, and it has reportedly threatened to do
so against India on at least four occasions. 175 Israel and North Korea are
not known to have issued authoritative NFU policy statements. 
176
Who's Coming to Dinner, Chinese General Who Threatened Nuclear Strike on U.S. Visits
Washington This Week, WASH. FREE BEACON (2013) (quoting Chinese generals threatening
to use nuclear weapons against the United States in a conflict over Taiwan).
172. REACHING CRITICAL WILL, supra note 130, at 53-54; Simpson, supra note 166, at
69-75; Assessing Progress, supra note 171, at 6, 12; Bunn & du Preez, supra note 158.
173. P.M. Kamath, Indian Nuclear Doctrine: Arming to Disarm, in NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT: REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROGRESS 63, 65 (2013) (reporting that India
had pledged not to use nuclear weapons "against states which do not possess nuclear
weapons, or are not aligned" with other nuclear weapons states; subsequently, India
modified the pledge to say "if a non-nuclear power uses biological or chemical weapons
(BWC), India will keep the option of using nuclear weapons open."); Prime Minister
Proposes No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons, INDIAN EXPRESS (Apr. 2, 2014, 2:26 PM),
available at http://indianexpress.corn/article/india/india-others/prime-minister-proposes-no-
first-use-of-nuclear-weapons/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Manmohan Singh, Inaugural
Address on a Nuclear Weapon-Free World: From Conception to Reality (Apr. 2, 2014);
India Call for Global "No First Use" Nuke Policy, GLOBAL SEC. NEWSWIRE (2010),
available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/india-calls-for-global-no-first-use-nuke-policy/
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Feiveson & Hogendoorn, supra note 162, at 92; Assessing
Progress, supra note 171, at 29-30.
174. Indian Party Backpedals on Provocative Nuclear Policy Remarks, GLOBAL SEC.
NEWSWIRE (Apr. 9, 2014), available at http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/indian-party-
backpedals-provocative-nuclear-policy-remarks/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014); BJP Puts No-
First-Use Nuclear Policy in Doubt, TIMES INDIA (Apr. 7, 2014), available at http://
newsindiatimes.com/bjp-puts-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-in-doubt/ (last visited Dec. 18,
2014); P.R. Chari, India's Nuclear Doctrine: Stirrings of Change, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
INT'L PEACE (June 4, 2014), available at http://camegieendowment.org/201
4/06/04/india-s-nuclear-doctrine-stirrings-of-change (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
175. See Feiveson & Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 92; but see Assessing Progress,
supra note 171, at 35 (discussing Pakistani NFU pledge).
176. See Feiveson & Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 92; Assessing Progress, supra
note 171, at 38 (noting North Korean nuclear threats).
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D. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones.
Another important forum in which NSAs have been expressed has
been a series of regional "nuclear weapon free zones" ("NWFZs").
Typically, a zone of this sort is established by a treaty among the states
in a particular geographic area; it reinforces the NPT by fostering
additional non-proliferation undertakings that may be more precisely
tailored to conditions in the particular region, and by engrafting
additional, more intrusive verification arrangements that might be more
acceptable among states that already know and trust each other
relatively well. 177  Five such zones are currently in place, for Latin
America (1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco); 178 the South Pacific (1985 Treaty
of Raratonga); 179 Southeast Asia (1995 Treaty of Bangkok); 80 Africa
(1996 Treaty of Pelindaba); 181 and Central Asia (2006 Treaty of
Semipalatinsk). 182
177. See generally U.N. Report of the Disarmament Commission, U.N. Doc. A/54/42;
GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No, 42 (1999), available at http://www.un.org/ga/
search/viewdoc.asp?symbol=A/54/42(SUPP) (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (identifying
criteria for establishing a regional NWFZ); Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, U.N. OFFICE FOR
DISARMAMENT AFFS., available at http://www.un.org/disarmamentW /Nuclear/
NWFZ.shtml (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects, G.A. Res. 3472 (XXX) (1975), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3472(XXX)&Lang=E&Area
=RESOLUTION (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones at a Glance,
ARMS CONTROL ASS'N (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/
print/2567 (last visited Oct. 24, 2014); Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, NUCLEAR AGE PEACE
FOUND., available at http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/library/treaties/nuclear-free-zones/
trtynuclear-free-zone-index.htm# (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); NPT, supra note 153, art.
VII (noting explicitly the parties' rights to develop regional non-proliferation measures);
Jozef Goldblat, Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assessment,
NONPROLIFERATION REV. 18 (1997); Assessing Progress, supra note 171, at 6, 12;
REACHING CRITICAL WILL, supra note 130, at 12, 56-66; CSSS Briefing Book, supra note
166, at sec. F; 1995 RevCon decision, supra note 160, at 25, 65-87.
178. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967,
634 U.N.T.S. 326 [hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco].
179. South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, 1445 U.N.T.S.
177 [hereinafter Treaty of Raratonga].
180. Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 635
[hereinafter Treaty of Bangkok].
181. African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, Apr., 11, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 698
[hereinafter Treaty of Pelindaba]; 1995 RevCon decision, supra note 160, at 67-72.
182. Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia (Treaty of
Semipalatinsk), Sept. 8, 2006, No. 51633 available at http://disarmament.un.org/
treaties/t/canwfz/text (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). In addition, Mongolia has declared itself to
be a nuclear weapons free zone, and the leading nuclear weapons states have formally
acknowledged that status. See Daryl G. Kimball, Mongolia Recognized as Nuclear-Free
Zone, 42 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 6 (Oct. 2012), available at http://www.
armscontrol.org/act/2012_10/Mongolia-Recognized-as-Nuclear-Free-Zone%20 (last visited
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Each of the NWFZ agreements also includes protocols'83 in which
the NWS are invited to affirm (in text that varies somewhat from treaty
to treaty) that they will respect the non-nuclear status of the region, such
as by not stationing or testing nuclear weapons in the area. In addition,
these protocols ask the NWS to declare robust NSAs - promising that
they will not use nuclear weapons against states that have joined the
relevant treaty. In the Treaty of Tlatelolco, for example, the relevant
protocol passage asserts "[t]he Governments represented by the
undersigned Plenipotentiaries also undertake not to use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty for
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America."'' 84
In joining that protocol in 1971, however, the United States
appended an understanding or declaration' 85 that "the United States
Government would have to consider that an armed attack by a
Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon state,
would be incompatible with the Contracting Party's corresponding
Dec. 18, 2013). A proposal to make the Middle East a zone free of all weapons of mass
destruction has also been developed. Mukhatzhanova, supra note 158, at 22; Kelsey
Davenport, No Date Set for Middle East Zone Meeting, 43 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 32 (Nov.
2013), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_11/No-Date-Set-For-Middle-Eas-
Zone-Meeting (last visited Jan. 9, 2015). In addition, at least some nuclear weapons
activities have been banned by treaty from Antarctica. See, e.g., Antarctic Treaty, art. V,
Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71; outer space (Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, art. IV, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610
U.N.T.S. 205); and the ocean floor (Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of
Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean
Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, art. I, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, 955 U.N.T.S. 115,
T.I.A.S. No. 7337).
183. Under international law, there is no distinction between a treaty denominated as a
"protocol" and any other. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 97,
(defining "treaty," noting that any "particular designation" is immaterial). Often, the term
"protocol" is applied to a document that is attached to, or otherwise associated with, some
other treaty; what is unusual in the NWFZ context is the fact that in each instance, the treaty
and the protocol have completely non-overlapping sets of parties. See generally Marco
Roscini, Negative Security Assurances in the Protocols Additional to the Treaties
Establishing Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, in OBAMA AND THE BOMB: THE VISION OF A
WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 129 (Heinz Gartner ed., 2011).
184. Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Treaty of Tlatelolco, art. 3, Apr. 1,
1968, available at http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/tlatelocop2/text (last visited Jan. 9,
2015).
185. See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S.Prt.106-71, TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE (2001),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-106SPRT66922/pdf/CPRT-106SPRT669
22.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (noting different types of reservations, understandings,
declarations and other conditions the Senate might assert in its consideration of a treaty; the
vocabulary has been applied inconsistently).
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obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty."' 86 With this reservation, the
United States significantly restricted the scope of the original NSA,
apparently excluding from the pledge a possible first use of nuclear
weapons against an NNWS who was aligned in war with an NWS. 1
87
Other NWS have likewise sometimes reined in the scope of their NSA
commitments in other NWFZ instruments.' 88 The United States Senate
is now considering providing advice and consent to the ratification of
the protocols for the Pelindaba and Raratonga NWFZ treaties; it
remains to be seen whether additional reservations to the NSA
statements in those documents will be appended.' 89
E. Assessment of the Non-Use Declarations.
Although the population of NFU, NSA, and PSA statements is now
rather large, their overall efficacy is quite restricted. First, they are far
from comprehensive or uniform in content. The United States and other
NWS have frequently inserted distinct national caveats and subtle
disclaimers that have undercut the potentially bold reach, reserving the
186. GRAHAM, JR. & LAVERA, supra note 13, at 57 (quoting Richard Nixon,
Ratification of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America (1971)).
187. The content of this 1971 condition is somewhat more restrictive than the current
global U.S. NSA policy, as reflected in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, supra note
126. See Bunn & du Preez, supra note 158.
188. See Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, U.N. OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS.,
available at http://www.un.org/disarmamentIWMD/Nuclear/NWFZ.shtml (last visited Dec.
18, 2014) (collecting NWS statements attached to ratification of protocols to NWFZ
treaties); Assessing Progress, supra note 171, at 14, 17, 20, 22; see also Spector & Ohlde,
supra note 166 (arguing that NWFZ protocols are superior to unilateral NSAs for
entrenching legal protections); Roscini, supra note 183, at 134-38.
189. Peter Crail, The Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty Protocols and US. National
Security, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N ISSUE BRIEF, May 20, 2011; see also Feiveson &
Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 96 (discussing U.S. 1996 statement upon signing protocol
to Treaty of Pelindaba). Notably, NWFZs seem to be one of the few arms control topics on
which the NWS have recently been able to collaborate effectively, despite their other
ongoing political difficulties. Regarding the Central Asia zone, for example, the leading
countries had long been irreconcilably divided regarding one provision of the Semipalatinsk
Treaty which appeared to give Russia a right to re-introduce nuclear weapons into the
region. After five years of frustrated negotiations among the NWS, a solution to the
problem was suddenly developed in April 2014, and the protocol was quickly signed by all
five states. See Rachel Oswald, Five Powers Agree to Respect Central Asian Nuclear-Free
Zone, GLOBAL SEC. NEWSWIRE (Apr. 30, 2014), available at
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/five-nuclear-powers-agree-sign-protocol-central-asian-nuclear
-free-zone/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Office of the Spokesperson, United States Signs
Protocol to Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, U.S. DEPT. ST. (May 6,
2014), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/225681.htm (last visited Dec.
18, 2014).
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right to use nuclear weapons first, even against an NNWS, in open-
ended circumstances. 90 Second, many of the commitments are not
global; they apply only to states in specified geographic regions, or who
otherwise meet the designated criteria. 191
Third, the NWS statements are of contested legal status. The
NSAs inscribed in an NWFZ protocol are authoritative for the countries
that have joined the instrument, but the pledges extended in the context
of NPT review conferences are more dubious. NNWS contend that the
commitments are key elements of a bargained-for exchange, but the
NWS have waffled.192 Fourth, the assurances consist solely of words on
papers - there is no "operationalization" of the commitments, no
concrete steps that the NWS must undertake to validate the seriousness
of the undertakings. When nothing has to change in the real world
regarding the number, status or treatment of the nuclear forces, the
NNWS cannot be fully confident in reliability of the declarations.
Certainly, even a naked verbal commitment counts for something, but it
is equally clear that such a declaration is, as a practical matter,
unverifiable and subject to being swiftly revised or even ignored as
circumstances demand in extremis.
As a result, the existing NFU, NSA, and PSA statements have not
been fully satisfactory to the NNWS. The undertakings have not
provided sufficient reassurance that it is reliably safe to forego a
possible nuclear weapons option, and have therefore not achieved the
non-proliferation value the NWS anticipated. Viewed differently, the
heavily qualified NFU, NSA and PSA rhetoric has not succeeded in
communicating any diminished future importance for nuclear weapons.
The NWS sought to convey a message of restraint, suggesting that
nuclear weapons are not to be forever "the coin of the realm," not the
indelible badge of first-class national status in the world. But their
collective slipperiness in declining to offer comprehensive assurances
seems to implant precisely the opposite signal. If the NWS are
unwilling to overtly and unconditionally agree not to use nuclear
weapons first, why should the NNWS not emphasize and perhaps
190. Simpson, supra note 166, at 64 (reporting dissatisfaction among NNWS because
the NSAs were not uniform or issued jointly by all the NWS).
191. Spector & Ohlde, supra note 166 (comparing NWFZ and NSA approaches; also
noting that the non-parties to the NPT (India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan) are not
allowed to join the protocols to the NWFZ treaties).
192. See Bunn & du Preez, supra note 158; Simpson, supra note 166, at 64; Feiveson
& Hogendoorn, supra note 162, at 96; New Zealand Working Paper, in CSSS Briefing
Book, supra note 166, at J-4; Graham & Tomero, supra note 166; Spector & Ohlde, supra
note 166.
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pursue those arms, too? If the NWS, with their enormous conventional
weapons capabilities and elite army, navy, air force, and Marines, report
that they cannot entirely dispense with the possibility that it might be
necessary to use nuclear weapons first, how could other, smaller and
less well-defended states ignore that same hawkish logic?
1 93
In fact, nuclear weapons remain firmly lodged in a priority position
in international relations. People sometimes observe that these arms
have not been used since 1945, but in another, deeper sense, they are
"used" every day - to deter, coerce, and intimidate - even without being
detonated. And the United States has quite frequently considered the
possibility of using nuclear weapons in the explosive sense, too. By one
count, on at least twenty-five occasions, the U.S. leadership seriously
contemplated a first application of the awesome power.' 94 Sometimes,
the perpetual threat of nuclear weapons is made overt, such as by
communicating the ominous suggestion that "all options are on the
table" for a response to a particular crisis - nothing could be a more
vivid reminder that the United States retains the physical capacity and
the legal right to flex its strongest muscles at will. '95
Finally, it must be observed that the NWS are certainly not acting
193. Feiveson & Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 95 (stating that "the continued
reliance on hedged no-first-use policies by the United States and other nuclear powers is
often one of the rationales nuclear weapons advocates from non-nuclear-weapons states
offer as justification for abandoning NPT commitments and developing their own nuclear
weapons."); Bunn & du Preez, supra note 158; Gerson, supra note 149, at 41-42 (arguing
that U.S. retention of the option to use nuclear weapons first "undermines the NPT regime
by signaling that even the world's most affluent and powerful nation continues to believe
that nuclear weapons are important instruments of national power."); see Graham &
Tomero, supra note 166.
194. See Daniel Ellsberg, Roots of the Upcoming Nuclear Crisis, in THE CHALLENGE
OF ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS 45, 52-53 (David Krieger ed., 2009) (listing twenty-five
occasions from 1948 to 2008 when the United States threatened or considered the first use
of nuclear weapons).
195. Id. at 47 (citing examples of U.S. leaders emphasizing that "all options are on the
table," clearly including nuclear weapons); id. at 56-57 (highlighting the unspoken, but
clear, threat to use nuclear weapons against Iraq in 1991 if Saddam Hussein used chemical
weapons); see also Jeremy Bender, The US is Conducting a Massive Nuclear Arms Drill
Days After a Russian Nuclear Exercise, Bus. INSIDER (May 12, 2014), available at
http://www.businessinsider.com/us-conducting-a-massive-nuclear-arms-drill-20
14-5 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (noting that in the midst of the 2014 crisis over Ukraine,
both the United States and Russia conducted nuclear weapons exercises); Assessing
Progress, supra note 171, at 26 (noting that President Obama asserted that he "will take no
options off the table" in responding to Iran's nuclear program); see also Russian General
Calls for Preemptive Nuclear Strike Doctrine Against NATO, Moscow TIMES (Sept. 3,
2014), available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russian-general-calls-
for-preemptive-nuclear-strike-doctrine-against-nato/506370.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014)
(recent Russian rhetoric about preemptive military strike).
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as if they intend to get out of the nuclear weapons business at any point
in the foreseeable future. Even while the numbers of deployed,
operational nuclear weapons are falling or stable for some of the nine
possessing states,196 there are other indicators of an emerging nuclear
bull market. Russia is undertaking a substantial modernization of its
strategic weapons, investing in new generations of land- and sea-based
missiles. 197 China, India, and Pakistan are building up, too.'98  In the
United States, there is no ongoing construction of additional nuclear
weaponry, but medium-term plans call for a massive recapitalization of
all three legs of the "triad" (land-based missiles, submarine-based
missiles, and long-range bombers), and the imperative for indefinitely
sustaining the infrastructure that supports, maintains, and operates the
nuclear establishment is routinely stressed.199
196. See sources cited supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
197. REACHING CRITICAL WILL, supra note 130, at 34; Watts, supra note 149, at 44-45;
Kristensen, supra note 130; Pavel Podvig, Russian Federation, in Assuring Destruction,
supra note 130, at 59-66.
198. Assessing Progress, supra note 171, at vi, 29, 35; Hui Zhang, China, in Assuring
Destruction, supra note 130, at 17-26; M.V. Ramana, India, in Assuring Destruction, supra
note 130, at 34-43; Zia Mian, Pakistan, in Assuring Destruction, supra note 130, at 51-58;
Tim Craig & Karen DeYoung, Pakistan Is Eyeing Sea-Based and Short-Range Nuclear
Weapons, Analysts Say, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2014), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-is-eyeing-sea-based-and-short-
range-nuclear-weapons-analysts-say/2014/09/20/1 bd9436a- 11 bb-1 Ie4-8936-
26932bcfd6ed story.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
199. Amy F. Woolf, Nuclear Modernization in an Age ofAusterity, 44 ARMS CONTROL
TODAY 20 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_03/
Nuclear-Modemization-in-an-Age-of-Austerity (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (quoting
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel regarding U.S. plans to "invest in the modernization we
need"); Jon B. Wolfshtal et al., The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad: US Strategic Nuclear
Modernization Over the Next Thirty Years, JAMES MARTIN CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION
STUD. 28 (Jan. 2014), available at http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/140107_trillion dollar_
nuclear triad.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (concluding that the United States plans to
spend approximately one trillion dollars maintaining its current nuclear missiles,
submarines, bombers and other weapons, procuring replacement systems, and upgrading
existing bombs); William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, U.S. Ramping up Major Renewal in
Nuclear Arms, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2014), available at http://www.ny
times.com/2014/09/22/us/us-ramping-up-major-renewal-in-nuclear-arms.html?_r-0 (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014); Andrew Lichterman, United States, in Assuring Destruction, supra
note 130, at 89-111; REACHING CRITICAL WILL, supra note 130, at 38-39; Kristensen &
Norris, US Nuclear Forces, supra note 127; Acheson, supra note 130; Tom Z. Collina, US.
Nuclear Arms Spending Set to Rise, 44 ARMS CONTROL TODAY 31 (Apr. 2014), available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014 04/J-S-Nuclear-Arms-Spending-Set-to-Rise%20 (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014); Kristensen, supra note 130. But see Al Mauroni, A Rational
Approach to Nuclear Weapons Policy, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Apr. 28, 2014), available at
http://warontherocks.com/2014/04/a-rational-approach-to-nuclear-weapons-policy/ (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014) (arguing that a U.S. reinvestment in nuclear weapons is overdue and
affordable).
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IV. A PROPOSED NEW TREATY
This section presents the draft text of a proposed new treaty,
200
together with annotations that explain the provisions and highlight key
precedents. It is styled as a "Nuclear Kellogg-Briand Pact," and
attempts to provide the "nuts and bolts" that can build upon some of the
lessons identified in Section II and address the problems highlighted in
Section III.
Nuclear Kellogg-Briand Pact
General Treaty for the Renunciation of Nuclear War as an
Instrument of National Policy
The States Parties to this Treaty,
Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of
mankind;20 1
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all
mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort
to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the
security of peoples; 20
2
Sharing the view that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never
be fought; 20
3
Acknowledging the obligations contained in article VI of the 1968
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, "to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
200. Compare the proposed treaty with N.Z., New Agenda Coal., Security Assurances
J-4 to -6 (Prep. Comm. for the 2005 Review Conf. of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-
Prolif. of Nuclear Weapons, Working Paper, 2003), in CSSS Briefing Book, supra note 166,
at J-5 (describing a draft treaty "on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons"), and Bunn & Timerbaev, supra note 165, at 18 (presenting brief draft
declaration and U.N. Security Council resolution on NSAs).
201. This paragraph copies the first preambular paragraph of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand
Pact. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1.
202. This paragraph copies the first preambular paragraph of the NPT. NPT, supra
note 153; see also sources cited supra note 124.
203. This passage comes from Ronald Reagan's Third State of the Union Address in
1984. Reagan, supra note 151. It is reflected in the preambles to the Nuclear Risk
Reduction Centers Agreement, supra note 82, 1530 U.N.T.S 387; second preambular
paragraph and the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement, supra note 83, 27
I.L.M. 1200.
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effective international control"; 20 4
Recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of
Justice of July 8, 1996, which affirmed that in view of the widespread,
long-lasting and severe effects of nuclear weapons, the threat or use of
nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, and that nuclear weapons
are generally subject to the same rules of international law applicable to
all other weapons;
215
Recalling also that, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and
maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with
the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic
resources;
206
Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of
nuclear war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the
end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their
peoples may be perpetuated; 20 7
Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another
should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful
and orderly process and that no Party should promote its national
interests by resort to nuclear war;20 8
Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other nations of
the world will join in this humane endeavor and by adhering to the
present Treaty as soon as it comes into force, bring together their
peoples within the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting the
nations of the world in a common renunciation of nuclear war as an
instrument of their national policy; 20 9
204. NPT, supra note 153, art. V1.
205. See ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra note 139, at 266.
206. This paragraph is taken from the twelfth preambular paragraph of the NPT. NPT,
supra note 153.
207. This paragraph is adapted from the second preambular paragraph of the original
Kellogg-Briand Pact. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1. The comment about "peaceful
and friendly relations now existing" is probably about as true today as it was in 1928.
208. This paragraph is adapted from the third preambular paragraph of the original
Kellogg-Briand Pact and modified to avoid the 1928 treaty's insistence upon reciprocity;
this document is intended to have global coverage. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1.
209. This paragraph is adapted from the fourth (final) preambular paragraph of the
original Kellogg-Briand Pact. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1.
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Have agreed as follows:
Article 1. Renunciation
The Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective
peoples210 that they condemn and renounce recourse to nuclear war21
for the solution of international controversies, 212 as an instrument of
national policy, or for any other reason.
213
Article II. Dispute Resolution
The Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or
conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which
may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific
means.
2 14
210. This reference to the "peoples," instead of solely to the states or their
governments, reflects the populist anti-war sentiment propelling the 1928 negotiations; it
was included in the 1928 agreement, Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, but is no longer
customary; cf U.N. Charter, supra note 2, at preamble (stating that "We the peoples of the
United Nations" are determined to achieve specified objectives; and "Accordingly, our
respective Governments" establish the U.N. organization).
211. Like the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, this proposed treaty does not confine the term
"war" to the sense of formally declared war; it applies to all uses of nuclear weapons in
international and non-international armed conflict. Note that the U.N. Charter, supra note 2,
art. 2 para 4, refers to a "use of force," in order to avoid any suggestion that states might
escape some legal responsibility simply by fighting without officially declaring war. See
also Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, art. 1.
212. This sentence omits "in their relations with one another" from the 1928 treaty, in
order to ensure that the protections of the nuclear treaty are applicable to all countries,
regardless of whether they join the agreement, as well as to non-state actors or any other
target. This proposed treaty thus also exceeds the coverage of the existing Nuclear Weapon
Free Zone treaties and associated protocols, supra notes 178-89, which provide non-use
guaranties only to states in particular geographic regions.
213. See Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, art. 1. This sentence re-works the syntax
of the original Kellogg-Briand passage, and adds "or for any other reason," to avoid the
criticism that the 1928 agreement might have been interpreted to permit a recourse to war
that was somehow construed not to be "for the solution of international controversies" or "as
an instrument of national policy." Id.; see also sources cited supra note 25.
214. See Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 1, art. 2. This article is substantively
identical to article 11 of the 1928 treaty. It does not specify any particular pacific means for
settling or solving international disputes or conflicts, and neither this accord nor the 1928
original establishes any new institutions or organizations for those purposes. In the interwar
period, the League of Nations and multiple other institutions contributed to peaceful
resolution of disputes. See League of Nations Covenant, supra note 36. Today, the United
Nations family offers even more possibilities. See U.N. Charter, supra note 2; see also
sources cited supra note 11 (organizations created by arms control treaties). Unlike the
2014]
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Article III. Declarations
Each Party shall declare, upon entry into force of this agreement
for it, that it renounces any right to use nuclear weapons 2 5 absolutely,
under any circumstances, at any time, and against any target, or that it
reserves the right to use nuclear weapons, subject to the laws of armed
conflict, 2 16 in response to a first use of nuclear weapons against it, its
armed forces, or its allies.2 7 The Party may rescind or modify this
Covenant of the League of Nations, this agreement does not specify a "cooling off period"
for use of alternative dispute resolution forums prior to a recourse to force. See League of
Nations Covenant, supra note 36, art. 12.
215. The treaty might offer a definition of the term "nuclear weapon," to exclude so-
called "dirty bombs" (which use nuclear materials, but do not involve a nuclear explosion)
and "peaceful nuclear explosions" (which would use nuclear explosive power for civil
engineering purposes).
216. Many believe that, in view of the devastating power and long-term effects, a use
of nuclear weapons can never conform to the law of armed conflict principles of
discrimination and proportionality, but the ICJ has been unable definitively to reach such a
conclusion. See ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra note 139, para.
105(2)(E).
217. The text of the 1928 treaty does not contain any overt limitation or exemption
from the broad prohibition against recourse to war, but the negotiating history clearly
establishes a distinction between aggressive or offensive war vs. defensive or responsive
war. See sources cited supra note 29 and accompanying text. This proposed text makes the
distinction explicit between "first use" of nuclear weapons and "second use," and allows
each party to reserve the right to respond in kind against an attacker's initiating the use of
nuclear weapons. Presumably, the NNWS parties to the NPT, who have given up the right
to possess nuclear weapons, would opt for the "absolute" renunciation of nuclear weapons,
while the NWS might retain the legal right to use nuclear weapons responsively. The
distinction between aggressive and defensive conventional war can be quite elusive; the
facts about who shot first or which state committed the first offensive action could be
uncertain and contested under the 1928 Kellogg-Briand structure. In contrast, the line-
drawing required by this proposed nuclear treaty should be simpler-it should ordinarily be
relatively easy to determine whether a nuclear weapon has been used, and against whom,
releasing a victim state from its formal renunciation of nuclear weapons. In some
circumstances, perhaps, attribution of the nuclear explosion to a particular user might be
contested. See Understanding Nuclear Forensics in 5 Questions, INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY (2014), available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/forensics0707l4 0.pdf
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (discussing problems of determining the origin of nuclear
materials and steps to improve that capability).
Under this proposed treaty, even a single use of one nuclear weapon would release the
victim state from its non-use pledge. But that would not imply that there would then be "no
limits" on its legally permitted nuclear response; the traditional law of armed conflict
requirements (necessity, proportionality, discrimination, avoidance of unnecessary
suffering) would still apply. See generally, GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR (2010); MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2009); The
White House, Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States,
WHITE HOUSE (June 19, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
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declaration at any time by providing notification to the Depositary.218
Article IV. Threats
No Party shall, directly or indirectly, threaten a first use of nuclear
weapons .219 No Party shall engage in military or other preparations for
the first use of nuclear weapons.22 °
Article V. Security Assurances
Each Party shall provide or support immediate, meaningful
assistance to any state victimized by a first use of a nuclear weapon.
2 21
Each Party shall resist and reject any first use of a nuclear weapon by
any state.222
office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employment-strategy-united-states (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014) (official U.S. government statement that all plans for the possible use
of nuclear weapons must be consistent with the fundamental principles of the law of armed
conflict). The proposed treaty text would also prohibit any "pre-emptive" use of a nuclear
weapon, even in circumstances of "anticipatory self-defense," in which it was clear that an
enemy was preparing to launch an imminent attack.
218. The states possessing nuclear weapons have occasionally altered their respective
statements about "no first use" and "negative security assurances." See supra Section III.C.
219. See ICJ Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, supra note 139, para. 47
(concluding that a threat to use force in an illegal manner is itself a violation of the U.N.
Charter). Of course, the mere continued possession of nuclear weapons constitutes a type of
ongoing tacit "threat" to use them. This provision is intended to bar overt threats, as well as
implicit threats, such as an assertion that "all options are on the table" to respond to a
particular crisis. See sources cited supra note 194-95.
220. Cf. CWC, supra note 8, art. 1.1(c) (prohibiting military preparations to use
chemical weapons). Note that some acts undertaken in preparation for a possible second use
of nuclear weapons can be indistinguishable from acts that would be undertaken in
anticipation of using those weapons first; treaty negotiators would have to assume the
burden of drawing delicate lines in this area.
221. This provision is deliberately vague, not specifying the manner or extent to which
the assistance must be provided. It is a weak form of Positive Security Assurance, not
requiring, for example, any automatic use of armed force to defend the state victimized by a
first nuclear strike. The assistance may consist of political, diplomatic, medical, scientific,
humanitarian, or other aid.
222. This provision is likewise vague; it requires parties to oppose any first use of
nuclear weapons, but does not specify the form in which that opposition will be registered.
National decisions and U.N. Security Council measures containing particular reactions to
any first use of nuclear weapons will depend heavily upon the immediate facts. Some have
argued that the Kellogg-Briand Pact rendered the concept of "neutrality" moot, requiring all
states to unite against aggression. See Baratta, supra note 43, at 702-03.
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Article VI. Accidents
The Parties shall cooperate to the fullest extent possible to prevent
the possibility of nuclear war arising by accident, misunderstanding,
miscalculation, unauthorized action, or in any other way. 223
Article VII. Consultations
The Parties shall consult, on an urgent and high-level basis, in the
event of any accident, incident, or event that might lead to a threat or
first use of nuclear weapons. They shall make every effort to resolve
the problem without recourse to force.
224
Article VIII. Public Statements
Each Party shall moderate its official public statements 225 about
223. See Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War
Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, U.S.-
Russ., narrative, Sept. 30, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1590, available at
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4692.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (observing "[t]he very
existence of nuclear-weapon systems, even under the most sophisticated command-and-
control procedures, obviously is a source of constant concern. Despite the most elaborate
precautions, it is conceivable that technical malfunction or human failure, a misinterpreted
incident or unauthorized action, could trigger a nuclear disaster or nuclear war."); see
generally Patricia Lewis, Heather Wlliams, Benoit Pelopidas & Sasan Aghlani, Too Close
for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy, CHATHAM HoUSE (Apr.
2014), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/199200 (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014) (studying several cases of miscommunication, technical failure, or
accidents that could have escalated into nuclear confrontation).
224. Cf supra notes 78-86 (for a list of confidence-building treaties that require
consultation during crises).
225. It is unusual for a treaty to commit the parties to constrain the rhetoric in their
public policy statements. Partial precedents include the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, art. 20, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 386, which prohibits
propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred, and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 2,
660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966), which commits parties not to "sponsor, defend or
support" racial discrimination. See Steven E. Miller, The Utility of Nuclear Weapons and
the Strategy of No-First-Use (Nov. 15, 2002), available at
http://pugwashconferences.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/20021 llondonnws-paper miller.
pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (arguing that changes in public rhetoric alone will not
convince the world that a no first use policy is firmly in place, but they can help send the
message); see also Russian General Calls for Preemptive Nuclear Strike Doctrine Against
NATO, Moscow TIMES, (Sept. 3, 2014, 5:40 PM), available at
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russian-general-calls-for-preemptive-
nuclear-strike-doctrine-against-nato/506370.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (illustrating
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nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare, to emphasize the Parties'
collective judgments that nuclear war must never be fought; that nuclear
weapons must never be used; that nuclear weapons are categorically
different from all other weapons; and that the only valid purpose for any
continued possession of nuclear weapons is deterrence of a nuclear
attack.226
Article IX. Defense Plans
Each Party that possesses nuclear weapons shall modify its defense
policy guidance, plans and doctrine 227 to eliminate the concept of
launching a first use of nuclear weapons; to reduce or eliminate the
concept of launching its nuclear weapons "on warning"; 2 28 to eliminate
any automatic or immediate reliance upon a doctrine of massive
the kind of unhelpful recent rhetoric that this provision would restrict).
226. Each of these judgments reflects an effort to stigmatize nuclear weapons as being
beyond the pale of what states tolerate, even in the extreme case of armed conflict, and to
reinforce the longstanding international taboo against their use. See NINA TANNENWALD,
THE NUCLEAR TABOO: THE UNITED STATES AND THE NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE
1945 2997 (2008); Daryl G. Press, Scott D. Sagan, & Benjamin A. Valentino, Atomic
Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Am. POL. SCIENCE REV. 1 (Feb. 2013), available at http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/24013/FiNAL APSRAtomicAversion.pdf (last visited Dec. 18,
2014) [hereinafter Press et al.]; PERKOVICH, supra note 136, at 73-78 (arguing to strengthen
the taboo against use of nuclear weapons); see also supra text accompanying notes 147-51
(summarizing debate about the usability of nuclear weapons).
227. Different countries have different types of military planning documents. For the
United States, see Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States, Specified in
Section 491 of 10 US.C., U.S. DEPT. DEF. (June 19, 2013), available at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ReporttoCongressonUSNuclearEmploymentStrategySection
491.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of
the United States, WHITE HOUSE (June 19, 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-nuclear-weapons-employ
ment-strategy-united-states (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (announcing that the United States
will "examine and reduce the role of launch under attack in contingency planning");
National Security Strategy, U.S. Gov'T (May 2010), available at
http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review Report, supra note 126; see also G.A. Res. 68/40, U.N. Doc. AIRES/68/40 (Dec. 5,
2013), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/40
(last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (calling for review of nuclear doctrines).
228. The concepts of "launch on warning," "launch under attack," and related
doctrines are imprecise, but can be clarified in the negotiating history of the agreement. See
Arbatov et al., supra note 133, at 193-96 (discussing doctrines of launch on warning and
launch under attack; noting that only the United States and Russia have adopted these
concepts); Actions Report, supra note 86, at 4-5 (declaring that the United States will reduce
the role of launch under attack in nuclear planning).
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retaliation;229 and to emphasize reliance upon non-nuclear options.23 °
Article X. Alert Status
Each Party that possesses nuclear weapons shall reduce the
ordinary readiness and alert status of its nuclear weapons.
231
229. Sometimes, the doctrine of avoiding a full-scale, automatic, immediate nuclear
response to a first strike is referred to as "no early second use." Miller, supra note 225.
230. These elements are designed to promote movement away from any first use of
nuclear weapons, as well as to signal a reduction in the overall importance, salience, and
usability of nuclear weapons, and to diminish any sense that a use of nuclear weapons would
automatically or inevitably follow from certain provocations. They also help promote
additional time for mature reflection and consideration of non-nuclear options, even in a
crisis or war. See id (arguing that a policy of no first use "cannot be real if militaries
develop war plans that include, or even depend upon, the expectation of first-use of nuclear
weapons."); Fact Sheet: Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the United States, supra
note 227 (discussing efforts toward "reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our security
strategy.").
231. This provision attempts to reduce the "hair trigger" status of nuclear weapons, to
increase the decision-making time before they could be used. See REACHING CRITICAL
WILL, supra note 130, at 39 (reporting that the United States and Russia have about 1800
strategic nuclear warheads on high alert on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles; France
and the United Kingdom have respectively 80 and 48 of their weapons on submarines fully
operational, but at a lower level of readiness than U.S. and Russian weapons; China does not
maintain its weapons in fully operational status); Hans M. Kristensen & Matthew McKinzie,
Reducing Alert Rates of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH
(2012); Assessing Progress, supra note 171, at 5, 12 ((assessing readiness of states' nuclear
weapons), 13 (China), 16 (France), 18 (Russia), 21 (United Kingdom), 25 (United States),
29 (India), 31-32 (Israel), 35 (Pakistan)); see also Kamath, supra note 133, at 66 (describing
steps to reduce alert status of weapons, to make a "no first use" pledge more reliable, such
as removing warheads from missiles or pinning open the submarine missile ignition
switches); 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document, supra note 157, para. 90 (calling
for reductions in operational status of nuclear weapons, to enhance confidence and diminish
the role of nuclear weapons); Kulacki, supra note 171; John Burroughs, A Global
Undertaking: Realizing the Disarmament Promise of the NPT, MIDDLE POWERS INITIATIVE
BRIEFING PAPER (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.middlepowe
rs.org/pubs/Atlanta BriefingPaper 2010.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Actions Report,
supra note 86, at 4 (describing U.S. decision to continue the practice of keeping nuclear-
capable bombers off day-to-day alert); Arbatov et al., supra note 133, at 196-204 (providing
examples of steps that could be taken to reduce the readiness and alert level of nuclear
weapons); Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems, G.A. Res.
67/46, U.N. Doc. AJRES/67/46 (Dec. 3, 2012).
This provision does not specify how much reduction is required in alert status, nor does
it require that all weapons be held at the same (lowered) level of alert; treaty negotiators will
have to assume the challenge of working out these terms in additional detail. The provision
applies to the weapons' "ordinary" status, allowing a country to increase the alert status of
weapons during a crisis or war. Some may object that increasing the response time before
nuclear weapons could be used would increase a state's vulnerability to a surprise "bolt
from the blue" attack; others would respond that this type of instantaneous attack is now
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Article XI. De-Targeting
Each Party that possesses nuclear weapons deployed on ballistic or
cruise missiles shall alter the deployments so that ordinarily a missile
contains no targeting codes or is targeted by default toward unpopulated
ocean areas.
232
Article XII. Training Exercises
Each Party that possesses nuclear weapons shall refrain from
undertaking any military or other training exercises related to launching
a first use of nuclear weaponS.2 33
Article XIII. Arms Reductions
The Parties that possess nuclear weapons shall cooperatively,
promptly, and significantly reduce the number of nuclear weapons they
possess and deploy.234 They shall particularly reduce or eliminate the
vanishingly unlikely, and that the contrary dangers of an accidental, unauthorized, or
imprudent use of nuclear weapons now pose the greater threat. See PDI Live Debate 5: De-
alerting, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. (Nov. 5, 2009), available at
http://csis.org/event/pdi-live-debate-5-john-steinbruner-walter-slocombe-de-alerting (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014); Peter Huessy, Should the U.S. De-Alert its Nuclear Missiles?
GATESTONE INST. (Aug. 10, 2012, 4:30 AM), available at
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3266/us-nuclear-missiles-alert (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
232. See Assessing Progress, supra note 171, at 13, 16, 21, 25 (assessing states'
practices in maintaining active targeting of nuclear missiles); Actions Report, supra note 86,
at 4 (explaining that the United States will continue the practice of "open-ocean targeting"
of all deployed strategic nuclear missiles); Kristensen & McKinzie, supra note 231, at 18-19
(noting de-targeting steps by United States, Russia, and China).
233. The purpose of this provision is to reinforce the previous measures by ensuring
that parties do not practice or train to undertake the actions they have agreed not to do. See
Miller, supra note 225 (noting the aphorism that militaries fight the way they train, so a
NFU regime should ban military exercises that include practicing a first use of nuclear
weapons). Many of the provisions of this proposed treaty are not subject to external
verification of compliance, as most modern arms control treaties are, but fidelity to this
provision can be at least partially corroborated, as remote sensors can observe large-scale
training exercises.
234. The concept behind this provision is that countries will not need so many nuclear
weapons, if the function of those systems is confined solely to the role of deterring the threat
of a nuclear strike. Reductions of excess nuclear weapons could be undertaken unilaterally
or pursuant to formal or informal agreements. The depth of NNWS dissatisfaction with
NWS compliance with article VI of the NPT, supra note 153, requires that any "good faith
negotiations" in this area should be brought to a successful conclusion quickly. Note also
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types of nuclear weapons that would be most suitable for a first use or
whose use would be incompatible with the law of armed conflict. 235
Article XIV. Nuclear Disarmament
1. The Parties shall accelerate their efforts in pursuit of the total
elimination of nuclear weapons. 236  They shall undertake immediate
steps237 toward that goal, and shall promote in a joint enterprise 18 the
objective of the permanent, global, comprehensive, and verifiable
abolition of all nuclear weapons.239
that nuclear arms reductions can save parties a great deal of money. See DAVID KRIEGER,
THE CHALLENGE OF ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS (2009) (estimating that the United
States has spent $7.5 trillion on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems); Atomic Audit:
The Costs and Consequences of US. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940, BROOKINGS INST. (June
29, 1988), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/1998/atomic (estimating
the cost of the nuclear arsenal at $5.5 trillion through 1998) (last visited Dec. 18, 2014);
Dana Priest, Aging US. Nuclear Arsenal Slated for Costly and Long-Delayed
Modernization, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2012).
235. See Miller, supra note 225 (arguing that under a no first use regime, countries
would require far fewer weapons; forward-based and shorter-range nuclear forces would be
unnecessary; and the key criterion would be the survivability of nuclear weapons, not their
ability to be used immediately). Under this structure, countries would be especially
encouraged to divest themselves of vulnerable systems that would be subject to "use it or
lose it" calculations, forward-based systems that would be used very early in a war, weapons
that would be intended to attack hardened or deeply buried command bunkers, and large,
inaccurate weapons that would target population centers in a disproportionate or
indiscriminate way. See, e.g., B61-11 Earth-Penetrating Weapon Tested for First Time in
Seven Years, HOMELAND SEC. NEWSWIRE (Jan. 15, 2014), available at
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140115-b611 l-earthpenetrating-weapon-
tested-for-first-time-in-seven-years (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); U.S. Deploys Two More
Nuclear-Capable Bombers to Europe, GLOBAL SEC. NEWSWIRE (June 9, 2014), available at
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-deploys-two-more-nuclear-capable-bombers-europe/ (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014); Barry Blechman & Russell Rumbaugh, Bombs Away: The Case for
Phasing out US. Tactical Nukes in Europe, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 163 (July/Aug. 2014).
236. Parties to the NPT are already committed to pursue negotiations in good faith
toward this objective. See supra text accompanying notes 153-61.
237. See Shultz et al., supra note 132 (arguing that both a long-term goal of nuclear
disarmament and a series of practical, short-term steps in pursuit of that goal are necessary,
"Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the
actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.").
238. See generally Max M. Kampelman & Steven P. Andreasen, Turning the Goal of a
World without Nuclear Weapons into a Joint Enterprise, in REYKJAVIK REVISITED, 429,
429-47 (George P. Shultz, Steven P. Andreasen, Sidney D. Drell, & James E. Goodby eds.,
2008); see James Goodby, A World Without Nuclear Weapons is a Joint Enterprise, 41
ARMS CONTROL TODAY 23 (May 2011), available at https://www.armscontrol.org/
act/201 l_05/Goodby (last visited Jan. 9, 2015) (arguing that all states, not just the United
States and Russia, must participate in the effort to pursue nuclear disarmament).
239. See David A. Koplow, What Would Zero Look Like? A Treaty for the Abolition of
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2. The Parties that possess nuclear weapons shall maintain the
safety and security of those weapons for as long as they exist, but shall
not consider this to be a permanent function.
240
Article XV. Final Provisions
241
1. This Treaty shall be open for signature by all states
indefinitely. 24
2
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory states
according to their respective constitutional processes.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the deposit of
instruments of ratification by twenty states.243 For any state depositing
Nuclear Weapons, 45 GEO. J. INT'L L. 683, 712-15 (2014) (presenting a draft of a nuclear
weapons abolition treaty, specifying the "mantra" of criteria such an instrument must
satisfy).
240. Preservation of the safety and security of nuclear weapons is critical. See Barack
Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by President Barack Obama at Hradcany
Square in the Czech Republic, supra note 134 (promising that as long as nuclear weapons
exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal), but the point of
this provision is to underscore that the goal of nuclear disarmament is not simply an
impossibly-distant goal and that nuclear weapons should not be a perpetual fact of life.
241. These provisions are traditionally split into several separate articles; they are
combined here simply for convenience. For comparison, see START 1, supra note 8, arts.
XVII-XIX; CWC, supra note 8, arts. VIII-XXIV; and CTBT, supra note 8, arts. VII-XVII.
242. The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact was initially open for a select group of parties,
whose participation was required before the treaty could come into force; other states were
also invited to join. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. In this proposal, the
nuclear treaty would be open for all states on an equal basis.
243. There are several possible formulas for the entry-into-force provision of this
treaty. As drafted, the instrument will become operational as soon as any twenty countries
join. An alternative would be to require a higher number, and perhaps to require the
participation of some or all nine countries currently possessing nuclear weapons, thereby
ensuring a strong degree of consensus among the most affected states. However, the most
demanding approach would also, in effect, give each nuclear weapons possessing country a
"veto" over the treaty's entry into force for any state. That sort of provision has proven
highly problematic for the CTBT, which names 44 countries whose ratification is required
to bring the treaty into force. CTBT supra note 8, art. XIV.1, Annex 2. This provision has
had the effect of blocking the treaty's execution, despite the ratification by 161 states. See
The Status of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signatories and Ratifiers, ARMS
CONTROL Ass'N (2014), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ctbtsig (last
visited Dec. 18, 2014). Alternatively, the nuclear treaty could establish a high threshold for
entry into force, but also allow individual states to waive that requirement, bringing the
Treaty into force sooner for them. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 178, art. 28.2.
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an instrument of ratification thereafter, the Treaty shall enter into force
thirty days after the deposit.
4. This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations that are
incompatible with its object and purpose.2 44
5. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.245
6. This Treaty shall be subject to amendment as follows 246 : Any
Party may propose an amendment, which shall be submitted to the
Depositary for prompt circulation to all Parties. If one-third or more of
the Parties notify the Depositary within sixty days after its circulation
that they support further consideration of the proposal, it shall be
considered at an Amendment Conference. If the proposed amendment
is adopted at the Amendment Conference by a majority vote of all
Parties, with no Party casting a negative vote, the amendment shall enter
into force for all Parties ninety days after the deposit of instruments of
ratification by a majority of all Parties.
7. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the
right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme
interests.247 It shall give ninety days' advance notice248 of such
244. A "tougher" alternative would be to prohibit all reservations, or to permit some
types of reservations, but not those that would be attached to the most important provisions.
See, e.g., CWC, supra note 8, art. XXII; CTBT, supra note 8, art. XV.
245. Some arms control treaties are of unlimited (permanent) duration. See, e.g.,
CWC, supra note 8, art. XVI. 1; CTBT, supra note 8, art. IX. I. Others have fixed terms.
See, e.g., New START, supra note 152, art. XIV.2; NPT, supra note 153, art. X.2
(specifying an initial term of twenty-five years, after which a conference of parties
determined an indefinite extension).
246. Modern treaties contain multiple variations regarding amendment; some also
permit modification of technical or administrative provisions pursuant to an accelerated
process. See, e.g., CWC, supra note 8, art. XV; CTBT, supra note 8, art. VII; see also
Natural Res. Def. Council vs. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 464 F.3d 1, 9, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(limiting ability to modify an international agreement via a process that does not involve
presidential decision and Senate agreement).
247. This is the standard "supreme interests withdrawal" clause, common to arms
control treaties. It provides an "escape hatch" from the obligations, making it safer for
states to enter the agreement in the first place. See CWC, supra note 8, art. XVI; CTBT,
supra note 8, art. IX; New START Treaty, supra note 152, art. X1V.3. Withdrawal from an
arms control treaty has been rare, with only the 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the SALT I
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the 2003 North Korean withdrawal from the NPT as
precedents. Christer Ahlstrom, Withdrawal from Arms Control Treaties, STOCKHOLM INT'L
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withdrawal, including a statement of the extraordinary events it regards
as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
8. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as in any way limiting
or detracting from the obligations of the Parties under other
international law. A Party's withdrawal from this Treaty shall not in
any way affect its obligations under other international law, including
other arms control or disarmament treaties.249
9. Seven years after the entry into force of this Treaty, and at seven
year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall assemble in a Review
Conference to assess the operation and effectiveness of the Treaty, with
a view to ensuring that the object and purpose of the Treaty are being
realized.25°
10. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby
designated as the Depositary of this Treaty, and shall perform all
appropriate duties, including registering this Treaty pursuant to Article
102 of the Charter of the United Nations.25
11. The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish
texts of this Treaty are equally authentic.
252
In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized to that
effect, have signed this Treaty.
PEACE RESEARCH INST. YEARBOOK 763, 764 (2004), available at
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2004/19 (last visited Dec. 18, 2014). Alternatively, the treaty
could depart from precedent and prohibit withdrawal (except, perhaps, in the case of
material breach of the treaty by another party).
248. Alternatively, the time period specified for withdrawal could be shorter or longer.
See START 1, supra note 8, art. XVII.3 (six months); CTBT, supra note 8, art. IX.3 (six
months); CWC, supra note 8, art. XVI.2 (ninety days). A longer notification period
provides other parties additional time to react to the impending withdrawal, but in the case
of nuclear weapons, parties may feel the need for an ability to respond very quickly to the
most severe challenges.
249. This provision is designed to ensure the continuation in force of the 1928
Kellogg-Briand Pact. Cf CWC, supra note 8, art. XVI.3 (specifying that withdrawal from
the CWC would not affect a party's status under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, supra note 54).
250. See, e.g., CTBT, supra note 8, art. VIII (providing for review conferences every
ten years); CWC, supra note 8, art. VIII.22 (providing for review conferences at five year
intervals).
25 1. CTBT, supra note 8, art. XVI. 1; CWC, supra note 8, art. XXIII.
252. CTBT, supra note 8, art. XVII; CWC, supra note 8, art. XXIV.
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Done at (place) on (date).
V. CONCLUSION
The underlying goal of this article, and the purpose of the extended
thought exercise in drafting a nuclear version of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact, is to try to prompt a social psychic shift. The treaty-makers in
1928 succeeded in that type of grand enterprise; they midwifed an
important, lasting alteration in the predominant paradigm of
international warfare. Now it's time for governments and populations
around the world to exert a similar bit of radically creative fresh
thinking about nuclear war, in particular.
In today's security environment, we should no longer think of
nuclear weapons as a normal, inevitable part of the global architecture;
we should not contemplate them as "ordinary," usable implements in
the military toolkit that can lawfully be wielded as a matter of unilateral
national choice. Likewise, we should not deem nuclear weapons to be
inherently essential to our national well-being, and we should definitely
not perpetuate them as permanent fixtures in the defense firmament or
as indelible badges of big power status.253
Instead, people in the United States, in the other NWS, and around
the world, should appreciate that the era of nuclear weapons is
historically anomalous and that the hypertrophy of sizes, types, numbers
and sophistication of nuclear explosive devices was an artifact of the
bizarre circumstances prevailing during World War II and the cold war.
That absurd explosive Sword of Damocles need not hang over
humanity's head forever; we can progress to a safer, more modern
global society in which nuclear warfare no longer occupies a central
place.254
The rationales for adopting a nuclear Kellogg-Briand today spring
from multiple sources:
-Legally, almost any first use of nuclear weapons would violate
the accepted conventional and customary law of armed conflict. The
ICJ, in its 1996 nuclear weapons advisory opinion, was not quite able to
conclude categorically that all uses of nuclear weapons would be per se
253. See Berry et al., supra note 139, at 41-58 (emphasizing the importance of
delegitimizing nuclear weapons and stigmatizing their use).
254. See Schell, supra note 128, at 30 (offering the comparison that "[i]f I carry a rifle
on my shoulder during a war, it means one thing. If I continue to carry the rifle after the war
has ended, it means something very different.").
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illegal, but it is clear that in virtually all realistic applications,
considerations of necessity, proportionality, and discrimination would
rule out a legitimate first use.
255
-Militarily, the United States no longer needs to dangle the threat
of crossing the nuclear threshold; for all credible scenarios, the array of
conventional munitions would suffice, without engaging the "overkill"
of atomic power.
256
-Strategically, abandonment of first use scenarios could reinforce
deterrence, by making it perfectly clear that the nuclear armada has
precisely one function: to deter a first use of nuclear weapons by anyone
else; that the nuclear arsenal should be optimized to perform only that
specified mission; and that conventional forces must be made adequate
for all other types of applications.257
-Politically, retaining the existing strategic ambiguity undercuts
our vital non-proliferation efforts, by degrading Article VI of the NPT;
the NNWS want comprehensive, binding NSAs in order to validate their
continued adherence to the most vital cornerstone of international
security.
258
-Financially, reducing and simplifying the nuclear weapons
infrastructure would save untold billions.259
-Prudentially, de-alerting and de-targeting nuclear weapons
would further reduce the likelihood of hair-trigger accidental or
255. Feiveson & Hogendoorn, supra note 162, at 94 (arguing that "a nuclear response
to chemical or biological weapon use would in most instances be out of all proportion to the
initial attack, and thus politically and morally indefensible"); PERKOVICH, supra note 136, at
49 (whether nuclear weapons could be used in compliance with international legal standards
"remains highly problematic").
256. Gerson, supra note 149; Bundy et al., supra note 149. But see PERKOVICH, supra
note 136, at 9 (arguing for retaining the option of first use in selected circumstances).
257. Gerson, supra note 149, at 39-40; Graham and Tomero, supra note 166, at 4
(arguing that "Threatening to use nuclear weapons against an NPT non-nuclear-weapon
state party undermines the credibility of a strong US and NATO conventional deterrent, and
may incite proliferation by emphasizing our sole strategic vulnerability.").
258. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, supra note 126, at 7 (asserting that U.S.
compliance with NPT article VI can help persuade NNWS to adopt measures needed to
reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime); Feiveson & Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 91
(arguing that "the use of nuclear weapons by the United States or another nuclear weapon
state could shatter the NPT regime and lead to the rapid spread of nuclear weapons to
several more countries"); Graham & Tomero, supra note 166, at 4 (arguing that maintaining
the option to use nuclear weapons first "reduces US leverage to stem the proliferation of
nuclear weapons").
259. See sources cited supra, note 234 (regarding the financial costs of nuclear
weapons programs).
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unauthorized nuclear war.260
-Reciprocally, refraining from threatening to use nuclear
weapons first would reinforce the global taboo against those arms,
diminishing the portrait of them as weapons that are necessary and
usable - including potentially usable against us.
2 6 1
-Most of all, psychologically, creating and promoting a nuclear
Kellogg-Briand could help shift global public and elite opinion away
from the notion that these are "normal" weapons. Even if there is only
an indirect, unreliable connection between public policy
pronouncements and physical actions in the real world, where we have
the possibility of nudging things in a safer direction, we should act.
262
The version of a nuclear Kellogg-Briand presented here has some
important similarities and as well as differences from the concept of the
1928 original, as those features were highlighted in Section II.D. In the
realm of "lessons learned," or at least analogies selected, the proposed
nuclear treaty, like the template, would be legally binding, multilateral
and public. It would also be, essentially, a "no first use" promise,
although the difficulty of drawing lines between first and second uses
should be appreciably simpler in the nuclear context. Like the original,
the nuclear variant would reinforce parties' commitment to non-violent
means of alternative dispute resolution, although it would not, on its
own, create new judicial, arbitral, or other institutions. Continuing with
the similarities, the nuclear treaty would be permanent (but would have
provisions for amendment and for "supreme interests" withdrawal) and
would not deal with criminal prosecution of individuals or states.
Regarding the salient differences, the proposed nuclear treaty
would include "operational" provisions, running well beyond a simple
declaration of renunciation and condemnation, to include specific
national action obligations. Notable among these undertakings would
be de-alerting and de-targeting nuclear missiles; revision of national war
plans, training exercises, and rhetoric; and a renewed commitment to
immediate and long-term measures of disarmament. And unlike the
paterfamilias, the undertakings in the proposed nuclear treaty would be
global in scope, not confined by reciprocity.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact was, of course, a flawed instrument. Its
authors' ambition and rhetoric far exceeded their grasp; the treaty left as
many questions unanswered and problems unaddressed as it resolved.
260. See Lewis, supra note 171.
261. See Sagan, supra note 162, at 175 (arguing that "U.S. [behavior], including
nuclear posture and doctrine, is in fact highly influential.").
262. See Tannenwald, supra note 226; Press et al., supra note 226.
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In such a concise format, it could hardly have succeeded as a lasting
macro-scale reformation in international political affairs. Kellogg-
Briand gained barely fifteen minutes of fame, and perhaps did not
deserve much enduring influence after the cataclysm of German, Italian,
and Japanese aggression and World War II.
This article's proposed draft treaty, likewise, is far from complete;
it is hardly a ready-for-signature outlawry instrument. In particular, the
absence of meaningful provisions on verification is highly contestable -
the draft has none of the obligations regarding data reporting,
inspections, enforcement, and the like, which have become de rigueur
in modern arms control treaty practice. In fact, many of its provisions
are so "internal" to each state's military structures that they are
inherently unverifiable - the required revisions of war plans and
national policy statements, for example, or the de-alerting and de-
targeting of nuclear missiles, are probably not reliably subject to
external corroboration. Moreover, the proposed document does not
address fundamental political questions about how to persuade possibly
reluctant NWS to jump aboard this bandwagon, or whether and how the
United States and any "coalition of the willing" should proceed
immediately with less than unanimous initial participation.
Most fundamentally, this proposal, like the original Kellogg-
Briand, is subject to the valid criticism that there could be an important
gap - perhaps a yawning chasm - between a country's publicly-
announced "declaratory policy" and its possibly-covert "action policy."
That is, regardless of whether a sovereign s it renounces war in
general, or nuclear war in particular, it may in practice still resort to the
forbidden avenue when the chips are down. Public postures and
unregulated treaties do not physically constrain countries - as long as a
state possesses nuclear weapons, it may elect to employ them at will.2 63
Just as Kellogg-Briand failed to prevent World War II, this article's
version cannot guarantee that no state would be willing to pay the price
263. Feiveson & Hogendoom, supra note 162, at 97 (arguing that this continuing
uncertainty about the reliability of a non-use pledge can be a benefit, providing an additional
element of deterrence to the regime); Ullman, supra note 165 at 680-81 (arguing that a NFU
pledge is "self-enforcing," because if one nation violates its promise, the others are released
from theirs); Gerson, supra note 149, at 45 (arguing that "Skeptics of the believability of
NFU underestimate the international and domestic audience costs incurred by a clear NFU
commitment."); Sagan, supra note 162, at 177 (arguing that "declaratory policy is not about
making 'promises' about future restraint; it is about signaling intent and therefore shaping
the expectations of allies and adversaries alike."); Pierce S. Corden, Ethics and Deterrence:
Moving Beyond the Just-War Tradition, in ETHICS AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY? . 156, 177
(Harold P. Ford & Francis X. Winters eds., 1977) (addressing ethics and strategy of
declaratory and action policies).
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of violating the nuclear agreement. Indeed, there are strong indications
that the Soviet Union, for example, was acting in bad faith when it
offered its "no first use" pledge during the cold war; it was cynically
prepared to abandon that puffery at a moment's notice, if need be.264
Still, that type of hypocrisy has its price, and a declaratory policy
can make a difference. Public presentations, especially when clad in the
garb of binding international treaty law, do help shape attitudes about
what is legitimate, about how honorable people and countries behave.
World public opinion is hardly all powerful, especially when dealing
with authoritarian regimes, but it can exert influence.265 Likewise, the
proposed treaty's "operational" provisions, going beyond the structure
of Kellogg-Briand by engrafting additional required behaviors, such as
progress toward nuclear abolition and constraints upon military plans
and exercises, can play a role. Complex organizations will do best at
the routines they have repeatedly practiced, and inhibitions upon
training algorithms can have meaningful impact in functional
settings.266
Certainly, there are risks from eschewing nuclear weapons, and a
policy to legally abandon any possible first use of those arms can have
potential costs. But there are risks on the other side of the ledger, too.
In particular, our collective clinging to nuclear arsenals and our
continued emphasis upon those arms as essential, indispensable
components of our security posture, carry the inevitable danger of
proliferation. The NNWS have made it clear that they will not
permanently tolerate a two-tiered world in which a privileged few
possess nuclear weapons that the vast majority of have surrendered; if
the NWS fail to redeem the promise of Article VI of the NPT, the
dangers will accelerate. A nuclear Kellogg-Briand, helping to move the
world an important step away from nuclear weapons, nuclear war, and
the fetish of all things nuclear, can make a contribution to that long-term
264. Heuser, supra note 167; Feiveson & Hogendoorn, supra note 162, at 92. Some
skeptics likewise doubt the sincerity and reliability of China's NFU commitments. See
Rachel Oswald, China's New Defense Paper Causes Stir Over No-First-Use Nuke Policy,
GLOBAL SEC. NEWSWIRE (Apr. 24, 2013); Kulacki, supra note 171; China Reaffirms "No
First Use" Nuke Rule, GLOBAL SEC. NEWSWIRE (Jan. 6, 2011); Stephanie Spies, China's
Nuclear Policy: (No) First Use?, CTR. STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, available at
http://csis.org/blog/chinas-nuclear-policy-no-first-use (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
265. See Iriye, supra note 34, at 68 (noting that the notion of "'world public opinion'
was a typically Wilsonian concept," connoting the existence of a moral force emanating
from people everywhere, rather than from their leaders, which could be mightier than armed
power and provided the best safeguard of peace and stability).
266. A New Look at No First Use, supra note 166, at 2 (emphasizing the importance of
cultivating a "culture of nonuse" of nuclear weapons within the military).
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pursuit of security and stability.
To some, the Kellogg-Briand Pact may seem obsolete, an antique
remnant of a long-distant past. But in reality, it wasn't that long ago.
The 1928 negotiation of Kellogg-Briand is closer to the 1968 NPT and
the 1969-1972 negotiation of SALT I (both indisputably central
elements in the modem cannon of arms control) than the NPT and
SALT I are to us today. And even if Kellogg-Briand were "ancient
history," sometimes there's something to be gained from "repurposing"
those hoary sources.
